

## COLLEGE 1: Een kritische blik op de universiteit en de wetenschap (18 november)

1. **Bongers, V., & Van Loosbroek, S. (2021).** De dekolonisatie van de academie: 'We zijn een wit, westers instituut en dat moet veranderen'. *Mare*, 30 juni, 2021 (6 p). **Hier p. 2-7.**  
<https://www.mareonline.nl/wetenschap/de-dekolonisatie-van-de-academie/>

Aanvullende bron: [https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culturele\\_dekolonisatie](https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culturele_dekolonisatie) **Hier p.7**

Aanvullende bron: <https://www.tlcenter.nl/kaders/dekolonisatie/> **Hier p. 8-9**

2. **Chin, A. (2021).** De sociale wetenschap kan wel wat meer subjectiviteit gebruiken. *De Correspondent*, 1 september 2021. (3 p) Zie [LINK](#). **Hier p. 10-12.**

Je kunt dit artikel ook luisteren i.p.v. lezen: <https://decorrespondent.nl/12679/de-sociale-wetenschap-kan-wel-wat-meer-subjectiviteit-gebruiken/36125331230252-23b8655b>

3. **What is the hidden curriculum?** <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7uGsj2HLpo&t=59s>

4. **Hanson, L. (2018).** *Science Education, Indoctrination, and the Hidden Curriculum*. In: Matthews, M. (eds) *History, Philosophy and Science Teaching. Science: Philosophy, History and Education*, Springer, Cham. Zie [LINK](#). NB: alleen p. 282-286 en 297-300 (paginanummers linksbovenin gebruiken). **Hier p. 13-20.**

5. **Syed et al. (2018).** Invisibility of Racial/Ethnic Minorities in Developmental Science: Implications for Research and Institutional Practices. *American Psychologist*. (12 p). Zie [LINK](#) (alleen via UB, na inloggen). **Hier p. 22-36.**

6. **Aflevering 1 Podcastserie Interculturele Pedagogiek met Zawdie Sandvliet:** [LINK](#)

Zawdie Sandvliet is socioloog, was werkzaam als docent bij de Hogeschool van Amsterdam, en als docent maatschappijleer bij het Lelylyceum in Amsterdam Zuid-Oost en is nu promovendus aan de Vrije Universiteit. Hij is van Surinaamse afkomst en gespecialiseerd in het Nederlandse koloniale verleden en ontwikkelaar van het vak Afro-Nederlandse studies.

## De dekolonisatie van de academie: ‘We zijn een wit, westers instituut en dat moet veranderen’

Vincent Bongers en Sebastiaan van Loosbroek  
woensdag 30 juni 2021

**De universiteit wil het curriculum dekoloniseren. Maar hoe doen docenten dat? Het betekent meer dan een extra vak of aangepaste literatuurlijst, zeggen ze. ‘Het gaat om gelijkheid.’ En dat kan ook gevolgen hebben voor personeelsbeleid of de beoordeling van studenten.**

‘Het is bedroevend’, zegt Alanna O’Malley. ‘We leven al zo lang met een onbalans, dat de pendule nu de andere kant op mag zwaaien. Niet alleen in Leiden, maar aan alle westerse universiteiten is er nauwelijks oog voor onderzoek uit de zogeheten Global South. Het gaat echt niet alleen om het negeren van Afrikaanse landen, maar ook om kennis uit bijvoorbeeld China, India en Brazilië. Westers onderzoek wordt boven al het andere geplaatst.’

Voor de bijzonder hoogleraar United Nations Studies in Peace and Justice is er geen twijfel mogelijk: dekolonisatie van het curriculum is noodzakelijk.

Het is ook een kerndoel van [het universitaire diversiteitsbeleid](#) dat ‘een inclusieve leeromgeving door inclusieve curricula, colleges en didactiek’ nastreeft.

### ‘WOKE GEMEKKER’

Critici krijgen daar de kriebels van en spreken van ‘woke gemekker’ dat ‘uit de Verenigde Staten is overgewaaid’ (zie kader). In de praktijk wordt het diversiteitsbeleid echter nergens expliciet opgelegd. Het expertisebureau diversiteit en inclusie adviseert opleidingen en ondersteunt indien gewenst initiatieven, meldt [het werkplan](#) van [diversity officer Aya Ezawa](#). Van dwang is geen sprake. Ook valt de term ‘dekolonisatie’ nergens.

Maar wat verandert er nu daadwerkelijk aan de Universiteit Leiden? *Mare* maakte een rondgang langs docenten en zocht uit waarom en hoe ze hun onderwijs en onderzoek aanpassen. Het is een intrinsieke wens vanuit de docenten zelf, geven zij aan. En, zo benadrukken ze, die behoefte bestaat al langer dan het diversity office.

-----

## **Niet alle wetenschappers zijn enthousiast over dekolonisatie van de academie.**

Als *Mare* [in maart een artikel publiceert](#) over een groep Leidse docenten die in het curriculum meer ruimte wil bieden aan niet-Westerse ideeën worden [op sociale media](#) de messen geslepen. ‘Stupide’, ‘woke gemekker’, ‘gutmenschebrabbel’ en ‘de deconstructie van de wetenschap in Nederland is begonnen’, luiden enkele reacties.

Gert Jan Geling, docent integrale veiligheidskunde aan de Haagse Hogeschool en promovendus in Leiden, [maakt zich in Trouw zorgen](#) over de opkomst van ‘diversity officers’ en het ‘dekoloniseren van curricula’ aan universiteiten. ‘Beproefde wetenschappelijke idealen als waarheidsvinding en objectiviteit verdwijnen naar de achtergrond’, schrijft Steije Hofhuis, promovendus geschiedenis aan de Universiteit Utrecht [in een opiniestuk in diezelfde krant](#).

Filosoof Sebasti n Valkenberg [waarschuwt in Elsevier](#) voor uit Amerika overgewaaiden idee n over diversiteit en activisme. ‘De angst om voor neokoloniaal te worden versleten, meegevoerd door een krachtige westenwind, hebben een ingrijpend effect. Ze leiden ertoe dat boeken en idee n helemaal niet meer aan bod komen.’

-----

Dekolonisatie is een ‘beladen term’, erkent Jingjing Li, universitair docent Chinese en vergelijkende filosofie. Maar het ‘is een proces, waarvan we erkennen dat het van belang is’. Door kritisch te kijken naar het curriculum en de literatuurlijst van hun vakken maken docenten meer ruimte voor perspectieven en idee n die niet-westers zijn, vindt historicus O’Malley. ‘Eindelijk komt er aandacht voor andere stemmen. En dat is echt hoognodig.’

Bepaalde disciplines zijn helemaal verweven met de imperialistische geschiedenis, zegt universitair hoofddocent internationaal recht Joe Powderly. ‘Kolonialisme heeft een enorme impact gehad op de ontwikkeling op mijn vak.’ Hij verwijst naar de Conferentie van Berlijn in 1884, die leidde tot het verdelen van Afrika onder Europese staten. Internationaal recht was in die context een instrument dat werd gebruikt om te koloniseren.

### **BEPERKTE BLIK**

‘Het is moeilijk te bevatten dat we niet het centrum van het universum zijn’, zo vat universitair docent sterrenkunde Pedro Russo de westerse houding samen. Die beperkte blik is schadelijk, stelt hij. ‘Het is belangrijk dat we zoveel mogelijk kennis verzamelen. Als we dat niet doen, dan remmen we de ontwikkeling van de wetenschap af.’

Leidse wetenschappers speuren daarom naar nieuwe bronnen. Universitair docent milieu-antropologie Tessa Minter zocht voor een eerstejaars vak, een brede inleiding over ontwikkelingssociologie, nadrukkelijk naar teksten die ‘eens niet gaan over Noord-Amerika en West-Europa, maar juist over de ontwikkeling van het vakgebied in Zuidoost-Azi , Latijns-Amerika, Sub-Sahara Afrika en het Midden Oosten. Die auteurs komen veelal ook uit die gebieden.’

Ook haar collega's laten studenten kennismaken met een grotere verscheidenheid aan auteurs. 'Die lezen niet meer alleen iets van Karl Marx, maar ook van bijvoorbeeld de Afro-Amerikaanse mensenrechtenactivist William Edward Burghard Du Bois.'

'We hebben een nieuw vak ontwikkeld, koloniale en wereldgeschiedenis, waarbij studenten leren werken met bronnen die in een koloniale context zijn ontstaan, zoals Nederlandstalige geschreven bronnen van de VOC en WIC en verzamelde objecten', vertelt Alicia Schrikker, universitair hoofddocent geschiedenis koloniale samenlevingen in Azië. 'We leren hen bijvoorbeeld om niet standaard het standpunt te kiezen van de witte mannelijke auteur, maar die van de personen die erin worden genoemd.'

Ook bij het vak algemene geschiedenis - dat alle eerstejaars volgen - is nu veel meer aandacht voor verschillende perspectieven. 'Vroeger kwam bij dat vak vooral West-Europa aan bod. Nu houden de studenten zich ook bezig met China, Afrika en het Midden-Oosten.'

### **INHOUD VS. DIVERSITEIT**

Hoogleraar internationaal recht Larissa van den Herik houdt in de gaten of de voorgeschreven literatuur voldoende gevarieerd is. 'We hebben nog steeds boeken op de lijst staan met één auteur, maar zetten in op werken waarin verschillende auteurs hoofdstukken schrijven. Dan heb je in het boek al meer diversiteit.'

Schrikker: 'Als je kunt variëren door niet alleen stof voor te schrijven uit Amerika, maar ook uit Indonesië of India, krijg je een breder beeld van wat er wereldwijd speelt.'

Juist dat is soms het mikpunt van kritiek: moet het niet alleen over de wetenschappelijke inhoud gaan, in plaats van een diversiteit aan auteurs? 'Dat is ook zo', zegt Schrikker, 'maar we hebben vaak wel de keuze uit goede literatuur die je nét zo goed kan voorschrijven als die van westerse auteurs.'

Ook Frank Chouraqui, universitair docent continentale filosofie ziet de nodige tekortkomingen. Er is een 'heel diverse Europese traditie in de filosofie, maar we kwamen erachter dat we te nauw kijken'.

'We zijn nog steeds erg gefocust op Euro-American filosofieën, daarom hebben we de bachelor- en masterrichting Global and Comparative Philosophy ontwikkeld, vertelt zijn collega Li. 'Een toenemend aantal studenten bestudeert interculturele filosofie.'

De koloniale tijd ligt toch al decennia achter ons, maar pas recentelijk zit er echt beweging in het aanpassen van het curriculum. Het is niet zo dat er nooit eerder is nagedacht over dekolonisatie, legt Schrikker uit. 'Maar de wereld is intussen veranderd. Over

wereldgeschiedenis wordt bijvoorbeeld nu veel meer dan dertig jaar geleden gepubliceerd in andere werelddelen dan de westerse. Het is ook een kwestie van voortschrijdend inzicht.'

### **AANGEJAAGD DOOR INTERNATIONALS**

Het proces van dekolonisatie wordt aangejaagd door de toename van internationals in de collegezalen. 'Vijf jaar geleden had ik voor het eerst een student in mijn groep die mij confronteerde met de witte literatuurlijst', zegt Minter. 'Ze vroeg: "Hoe zit het dan met Latijns-Amerikaanse sociologen?" De laatste jaren is antropologie een internationalere opleiding geworden met een heel diverse groep studenten, en alleen dat al zorgt ook voor diversere wereldbeelden en inzichten.'

Een van de kritieken op dekolonisatie is dat klassieke boeken het veld moeten ruimen voor nieuwe bronnen uit die andere delen van de wereld. 'Het gaat echter niet om het elimineren van teksten, maar om het aanbrengen van context', zegt Powderly. 'Sommige auteurs, ik zal geen namen noemen, verbloemen de koloniale dimensie. Dat betekent dat het werk niet compleet is, maar het houdt niet in dat het dan ook illegitiem is.'

Het doel is helemaal niet het in de ban doen van wetenschappers, benadrukt O'Malley. 'Het boek *Governing the World* van Mark Mazower is een standaardtekst als het gaat om mijn vakgebied. Maar het perspectief van de Global South komt vrijwel niet aan bod. Het is dus juist een interessant werk om kritisch te benaderen in een college. Je kunt het goed gebruiken om ons gat in kennis aan te tonen. Maar ik vind het lui als critici op dekolonisatie zulke boeken verdedigen omdat ze nu eenmaal mainstream en klassiek zijn.'

### **BEDREIGEND**

Chouraqui bespeurt weerstand tegen dekolonisatie onder collega's omdat ze denken dat het de status quo bedreigt. 'Maar het is juist een continuering van de status quo. We moeten het zien als een natuurlijke ontwikkeling, anders krijgen we onnodige confrontaties tussen conservatieven en progressieven. Terwijl het helemaal niet iets is van een van deze twee groepen.'

'Het risico is dat we verzanden in een gepolariseerd politiek debat over terminologie', zegt Van den Herik. 'Dat is jammer, want we kunnen het vast eens worden over inclusiviteit, openheid voor verschillende perspectieven en de vraag hoe de geschiedenis in het internationaal recht van vandaag doorwerkt en hoe we daar met elkaar open over kunnen spreken.'

'Docenten zijn van nature een beetje conservatief', weet Chouraqui. 'Ik hou er zelf ook niet van om dingen ineens anders te doen. Daarnaast hebben we te maken met systemisch racisme. Dat betekent niet dat docenten die weerstand voelen tegen diversiteit en dekolonisatie racistisch zijn. Maar iets wat onbekend is, creëert angst.'

Powderly: 'Het gaat om gelijkheid. Je moet niet defensief reageren met: "Het gaat prima zoals we het altijd hebben gedaan", maar jezelf openstellen en toegeven: "Misschien zijn er toch dingen die we niet goed hebben aangepakt."' "

'Het probleem is dat veel mensen wel vinden dat het nodig is, maar het niet daadwerkelijk doen', zegt O'Malley. 'Het is ook lastig. Ik hou me vakmatig met dekolonisatie bezig, en vind het al moeilijk.'

## KOLONIALE TELESCOPEN

Geldt dat ook voor de wereld van de bèta's? Volgens de Leidse hoogleraar natuurkunde Sense Jan van der Molen niet. 'Respect voor een andere cultuur is belangrijk, maar als de lichttheorie van het "Mohawk"-volk experimentele toetsing niet doorstaat, rest hetzelfde lot als Goethe's intrigerende lichttheorie', schreef hij vorig jaar in [een opiniestuk in Trouw](#). 'Aan licht valt niets te "dekoloniseren".'

Toch speelt dekolonisatie ook bij de exacte wetenschappen, stelt sterrenkundige Russo. 'Het gaat uiteraard niet om het herzien van de fundamenteën van de natuurwetenschappen. Ik claim helemaal niet dat natuurkundige theorieën niet zouden kloppen omdat ze zijn ontwikkeld door koloniale machten.'

Maar dekolonisatie is ook ongelijkheid bestrijden, zegt Russo. Een aantal van de grootste observatoria staan op een plek in de wereld waar de lokale bevolking daar nauwelijks van profiteert. 'Astronomen kwamen van Europa naar bijvoorbeeld Zuid-Afrika en bouwden daar observatoria op het land van inheemse volkeren. Dat zijn dus koloniale bouwwerken. De data worden daar verzameld en dan in het Westen verwerkt en gebruikt. Dat moet veranderen: landen waar de telescopen staan, moeten daar zelf meer aan hebben.'

## TERUGGEVEN

Antropoloog Minter ziet die ontwikkeling ook. 'Mijn onderzoek in de Filipijnen begon ooit vanuit de vraag: hoe dragen natuurbeschermingsgebieden bij aan het levensonderhoud van de bevolking? Daar kun je een heel academisch verhaal over schrijven, maar je kunt je ook op basis van interviews met lokale mensen afvragen wat zij belangrijk vinden. Daar komen soms heel andere dingen uit dan waar je vanuit je wetenschappelijke hypotheses naar zocht. Dat is ook dekolonisatie: niet alleen maar informatie onttrekken, maar ook teruggeven.'

Schrikker: 'De vraag of Nederland rijk werd van slavenhandel is relevant vanuit het Nederlandse perspectief, maar minder voor nazaten. Die willen liever weten hoe de mensen zich toen voelden, en of ze manieren hadden om met de ontworteling en het geweld om te gaan.'

Maar zijn die bronnen dan wel voorhanden? 'Gemarginaliseerde groepen hebben doorgaans minder opgeschreven, dat is een kernprobleem voor de hele wetenschap', zegt Schrikker. 'Maar als je al het materiaal bij elkaar brengt, en dat is in koloniale context ontzettend veel, lukt het


historici om ook dat perspectief te reconstrueren.'

## WIT INSTITUUT

Bij antropologie wordt niet alleen het curriculum kritisch tegen het licht gehouden, zegt Minter. 'We zijn ook onze eigen instituten aan het diversifiëren. We zijn nog steeds een wit, westers geschoold instituut. Dat proberen we te veranderen in het personeelsbeleid en dat gaat ook het onderwijs weer veranderen.'

'We staan nog maar aan het begin', zegt Van den Herik. Volgens haar zou zelfs de beoordeling van studenten op de schop kunnen.

'Er is ook niet maar één manier om dat te doen. Bepaalde studenten blinken meer uit in het geven van presentaties, anderen juist weer in het schrijven van papers. Als je die diversiteit aanbrengt in beoordelen, dan bied je ook meer ruimte aan al die verschillende invalshoeken en ideeën.'



WIKIPEDIA

**Culturele dekolonisatie** is het veranderingsproces van een maatschappij waarbij (westerse) koloniale denkpatronen over geschiedenis, wetenschap en cultuur worden teruggedrongen. Idealiter kenmerkt een 'gedekoloniseerde' samenleving zich door pluriformiteit, diversiteit en inclusiviteit.

Aan de basis ervan ligt het postkolonialisme. Culturele dekolonisatie komt tot uiting in het handelen van mensen, de inrichting van de openbare ruimte en op verschillende maatschappelijke terreinen. Een dekoloniaal perspectief dringt door in de wetenschappen, kunst & cultuur (musea), godsdiensten, sociale verhoudingen, economisch handelen, het onderwijs, de media, de politiek en wet & recht.

Culturele dekolonisatie is een maatschappelijk veranderingsproces dat plaatsvindt zowel in voormalig gekoloniseerde als in voormalig koloniserende landen.

Voor westerse landen levert culturele dekolonisatie - bijna per definitie - een spanningsveld op, omdat het gepaard gaat met kritiek op een vermeende universaliteit van westerse kennis en westerse normen en waarden.

Het koloniale verleden heeft nog steeds een invloed op onze beeldvorming. 'Dekoloniseren' gaat



[HOME](#)

[NIEUWS](#)

[KADERS & DEFINITIES](#) ▾

[KENNISBANK](#) ▾

[OVER TLC](#)



## In theorie

Dekolonisatie is het proces waarbij kolonies zelfstandig worden van een moederland.

Dekolonisatie wordt tegenwoordig ook vaak gebruikt om te verwijzen naar een proces gericht op het ontmantelen van koloniale machtsstructuren: dan hebben we het in feite over dekolonialiteit (decoloniality). Die structuren zijn gebaseerd op het behoud van de macht van de voormalige kolonisator en het onderdrukken en uitsluiten van “de ander”. Deze machtsstructuren die in stand zijn gehouden na de dekolonisatie van kolonies worden dan ook wel kolonialiteit (coloniality) genoemd, een term die voor het eerst door Peruviaanse socioloog Aníbal Quijano werd gebruikt.

Macht wordt niet alleen gehandhaafd door middel van geweld (kolonialisme), maar ook door middel van overheersende en legitimerende normen en ideeën (kolonialiteit). Hoewel het Westen sinds de Verlichting vaak wordt geassocieerd met democratie, gelijkheid en vrijheid, waren deze ideeën en waarden gebaseerd op een norm die Europees, blank, mannelijk en heteroseksueel was (de kolonisator). Deze norm heeft gediend om de onderdrukking van degenen die buiten dit model vallen (de gekoloniseerden) te rechtvaardigen, in het eigenbelang van de kolonisten. Dit heeft geleid tot het opleggen van onderdrukkende ideeën zoals racisme, patriërchaat, heteronormativiteit en antropocentrisme\*, die in de samenleving zijn ingebed om de macht te behouden. Dekoloniale academici stellen dat deze structuren zo diep in de moderniteit zijn verankerd dat ze vandaag de dag nog steeds bestaan.

Koloniale machtsstructuren zijn overal in de samenleving te vinden, vooral omdat deze structuren verborgen zijn in de productie en de verspreiding van kennis (normen en ideeën) via instituten. In dekoloniale theorie wordt vaak een onderscheid gemaakt tussen de volgende dimensies om die machtsstructuren te begrijpen:

Economie: deze dimensie heeft impact op de economische positie van mensen. Vragen die hierbij aan de orde komen zijn bijvoorbeeld welke uitsluitingsmechanismen er spelen op de arbeidsmarkt en hoe die bestreden kunnen worden.

Politiek: deze dimensie heeft impact op de machtspositie van mensen in besluitvorming. Een vraag die hierbij aan orde komt is bijvoorbeeld in hoeverre gemarginaliseerde mensen gerepresenteerd zijn in bestuurlijke organen, zowel in de publieke als private sector.

Sociaal: deze dimensie heeft impact op de sociale positie van mensen in de maatschappij. Vragen die hierbij aan de orde komen zijn bijvoorbeeld hoe verschillende maatschappelijke posities de dagelijkse interacties tussen mensen beïnvloedt, welke invloed dit heeft op uitsluiting van

gemarginaliseerde mensen en hoe dit bestreden kan worden.

Cultureel: deze dimensie heeft impact op de identiteitsvorming van mensen. Een vraag die hierbij aan de orde komt is bijvoorbeeld in hoeverre westerse cultuur en kennis als universeel wordt beschouwd of als specifiek eurocentrisch en hoe zich dat verhoudt tot niet-westerse kennis en cultuur.

### **In de praktijk**

Dekolonisatie wordt in de praktijk op verschillende manieren ingevuld, afhankelijk van de context. Zie het kader Dekolonisering hoger onderwijs voor de educatieve context. Wel zijn er drie fasen te onderscheiden in het proces van dekolonisatie:

Bewustwording: in deze fase wordt vooral gereflecteerd op wat kolonialisme en koloniale erfenis is en hoe het onze wereldbeelden en huidige samenlevingen heeft gevormd. Een concreet voorbeeld is de maatschappelijke discussie omtrent Zwarte Piet.

Betrokkenheid: in deze fase staat het betrekken van mensen centraal om koloniale erfenis te benoemen, te discussiëren en vooral uit te dagen. Een concreet voorbeeld zijn de protesten tegen Zwarte Piet, of het nu op straat is, op de werkvloer of aan de keukentafel.

Beleid: in deze fase wordt een actieve slag gemaakt van agendering naar beleid, waarbij een dekoloniaal alternatief wordt geïmplementeerd. Een concreet voorbeeld is het afschaffen van Zwarte Piet.

### **Maatschappelijke discussie**

Een belangrijke vraag die in de dekoloniale beweging wordt gesteld is hoe verandering bewerkstelligd kan worden en in hoeverre dit mogelijk is binnen de gevestigde structuren. In de discussie hierover worden over het algemeen twee visies besproken:

Verandering bewerkstelligen binnen de gevestigde orde: deze visie is gebaseerd op het idee dat verandering mogelijk is binnen de gevestigde structuren. Vanuit deze visie wordt ingezet op diversiteit en inclusie op machtsposities binnen die gevestigde structuren. De insteek is dat mensen uit ondervertegenwoordigde groepen op die machtsposities de nodige invloed kunnen uitoefenen om de norm in die structuren, die gebaseerd is op koloniale ideeën, te dekoloniseren.

Verandering bewerkstelligen buiten de gevestigde orde: deze visie is gebaseerd op het idee dat verandering niet mogelijk is binnen de gevestigde structuren. Vanuit deze visie wordt ingezet op het opbouwen van nieuwe structuren als alternatief voor de gevestigde structuren. De insteek is dat mensen uit ondervertegenwoordigde groepen vanuit een geheel eigen visie en filosofie kunnen opereren in plaats van te moeten bewegen in een context die al gevormd is door de norm.

## De sociale wetenschap kan wel wat meer subjectiviteit gebruiken

*Ashley CHIN, Beleidsmedewerker Bij1*

Op school leerde ik dat kennis uit boeken kwam. Dat ik, voor mijn spreekbeurt over het boeddhisme, beter informatie uit onze wereldoriëntatieboekjes kon halen dan me te beroepen op de gebruiken en tradities van mijn oma's. Dat de lessen van mijn docenten waardevoller waren dan de kennis die mij werd doorgegeven door mijn familie. Dat, bij wijze van spreken, een paracetamol beter werkt dan tijgerbalsem.

Dat klinkt misschien triviaal, maar in essentie groeide ik op met het idee dat er een verschil in waarde bestaat tussen wat ik meekreeg vanuit huis en wat mij werd geleerd op school. En dat verschil was groot. Voor het slapengaan vertelde mijn moeder vaak hoeveel ze ervan hield om te dansen in de stortbuien in Albina, Suriname. Mijn vader vertelde over de middagdutjes die hij, tussen zijn ouders in, nam wanneer de laaiende hitte van de droge dagen op hen neerdaalde. Mijn ooms spraken over de insecten en dieren waarmee ze speelden en de bruingekleurde wateren waar ze in zwommen. Ik ging naar bed met beelden van duizend kleuren groen, houten huizen op lage palen, en de geur van eten zwevend door de hoofdstraten van Paramaribo. Soms vullen mijn moeders ogen zich nog steeds met tranen wanneer ze denkt aan de jaren voordat ze naar Nederland verhuisde. Mijn vaders accent, een restant van zijn jeugd aan de andere kant van de wereld, heeft me altijd doen afvragen welke verhalen er verborgen zitten in zijn stem. Zolang ik me kan herinneren, heb ik mijn ouders altijd gesmeekt me mee te nemen naar het land van hun verhalen. Maar na zesentwintig jaar is Suriname voor mij nog steeds slechts een plek vol andermans herinneringen.

Toch zijn die herinneringen me dierbaar. Ze vormen een levenslijn naar een geschiedenis en een cultuur die niemand buiten mijn familie om lijkt te begrijpen.

### De gevolgen van een onderbelichte geschiedenis

Oorspronkelijk komt mijn familie uit de Guangdong-regio in Zuid-China. Een regio die een direct, maar onderbelicht verband houdt met Nederland. In 1858 werden de eerste Chinezen uit Guangdong naar Suriname gehaald om tot slaaf gemaakte Zwarte mensen te

vervangen op de plantages. Maar was het mijn beurt in de schoolkring om te vertellen waar ik vandaan kwam, reageerden klasgenoten en leerkrachten steevast met ongeloof. Zocht ik in mijn schoolboeken het hoofdstuk over de Nederlandse koloniale geschiedenis, stond er geen woord geschreven over Chinese, Javaanse of Hindostaanse 'contractarbeiders'. Het was alsof dit specifieke stukje koloniale geschiedenis niet bestond buiten mijn gemeenschap.

Dat maakte dat ik lange tijd heb getwijfeld aan mijn bestaansrecht. Thuis hoorde ik dat het koloniale verleden de reden was dat Chinezen in Suriname en later in Nederland terechtgekomen waren. Maar als het nergens stond geschreven, hoe kon het dan de geschiedenis zijn? Waren wij raar of waren we gewoon niet belangrijk genoeg voor een plek in die geschiedenis? En: hoorden wij überhaupt wel in Nederland?

Ook toen ik ouder werd, bleek dat kennis pas waarde krijgt als het wetenschappelijk onderbouwd, bewezen of onderschreven is. Pas als we de bron van de informatie kunnen terugvinden in artikelen, boeken of onderzoeken, vindt die kennis zijn weg naar sociaal beleid, onze historische canon of het algemeen bewustzijn. Maar wanneer bepaalde verhalen structureel onderbelicht blijven, hoe kan 'bewezen' sociaalwetenschappelijk onderzoek dan 'beter' zijn dan ervaringsdeskundigheid?

### **De vertrekpunten van de sociale wetenschap zijn niet zo neutraal als ze lijken**

Het zijn geleerden die historisch gezien de macht hadden te bepalen welke kennis als interessant genoeg werd beschouwd om te valideren met onderzoek. Geprivilegieerde witte wetenschappers die onderzoek deden naar een Exotische Ander naar eigen keuze.

Maar ook geleerden hebben blinde vlekken: wat weinig academici durven te erkennen, is dat de sociale wetenschap niet alleen historisch gestoeld is op eurocentristische en racistische overtuigingen, maar dat deze nog altijd voortleven in de huidige praktijk. Nog steeds wordt het onderzoeksveld gedomineerd door perspectieven van witte, mannelijke, heteroseksuele, cisgender mensen zonder beperking en vooral uit de midden- en hogere klasse.

Die perspectieven en de daaruit voortgekomen methoden zien we inmiddels als 'neutrale grond' op basis waarvan sociale wetenschappers 'objectief' onderzoek kunnen doen. En het belang van 'objectief' onderzoek blijft volhardend in de academische wereld. Bovendien houdt het idee dat geleerden beter in staat zijn geleefde ervaringen te beschrijven dan de mensen wier ervaringen het daadwerkelijk zijn, nog altijd stand. Hoewel er dus miljoenen verhalen zoals die van mijn familie zijn, bewegen weinig daarvan voorbij de grenzen van de gemeenschappen waaruit ze voortkomen. En wanneer ze dat wel doen, worden ze veelal verteld vanuit een *white gaze*.

Toen ik aan mijn masteropleiding in Advanced Migration Studies aan de Universiteit van Kopenhagen begon, wilde ik breken met de geveinsde objectiviteit van gevestigde academici. Met het idee dat een ander, geleerd of niet, beter in staat zou zijn om het verhaal van mijn gemeenschap te vertellen. Ik koos een drastisch andere aanpak en schreef mijn scriptie over de migratiegeschiedenis en identiteitsvorming van mijn familie.


Ik maakte een auto-etnografie, oftewel: een vorm van onderzoek die een collectieve of culturele ervaring probeert te beschrijven door middel van autobiografische *storytelling*. Voor de 'dataverzameling' interviewde ik mijn familieleden en putte ik uit eettafelgesprekken om de nuances in onze werkelijkheid te verwoorden. Ik was juist transparant over de manieren waarop mijn persoonlijke ervaringen het onderzoek kleurden. Dat ging niet zonder slag of stoot: ik moest mezelf continu rechtvaardigen tegenover supervisors en medestudenten. Want in lijn met traditionele sociale wetenschappen was mijn vertrekpunt niet neutraal genoeg, en werd er getwijfeld aan de validiteit en betrouwbaarheid van de 'data' die ik gebruikte, alsook de positie die ik innam als *insider/outsider*. Twijfels die begrijpelijk zijn, maar die de realiteit van diasporische gemeenschappen ook ondermijnen: herinneringen, familie verhalen en geleefde ervaringen vormen in grote mate ons leven en vertellen daarmee minstens net zoveel als de theoretische analyses waar onder andere antropologen en sociologen op terugvallen.

### Een radicale herwaardering

Het vertellen van mijn eigen verhaal was belangrijk voor mij. Niet in de laatste plaats omdat het optekenen van mijn verhaal in sociaalwetenschappelijk onderzoek een start kon zijn voor het doorsijpelen van de kennis en ervaringen van mijn familie naar de historische canon over de Nederlandse koloniale geschiedenis. Maar ook omdat ik mijzelf tijdens mijn gehele academische opleiding nergens terugvond. In plaats van me te herkennen in de onderzoeken die de werkelijkheid van migrantenfamilies moesten duiden, voelde ik me gereduceerd tot een casus. Tot een moeilijk te onderzoeken groep mensen, ondergerepresenteerd in de literatuur.

We hebben daarom een radicale herwaardering nodig van de kennis die we wetenschap noemen, en de kennis die we links laten liggen. Als de wetenschap ons helpt om de wereld waarin we leven beter te begrijpen en te verklaren, moet de ervaringsdeskundigheid van academici zelf een plek krijgen. De optelsom van geveinsde objectiviteit, gedateerde noties van neutraliteit en het geloof dat kennis pas valide is als deze is vastgelegd in de sociaalwetenschappelijke literatuur, doet onze samenleving namelijk tekort.

Want wat is de waarde van sociaalwetenschappelijke kennis wanneer de mensen over wie het gaat, zichzelf niet meer herkennen? En wat leert die kennis ons nog over de werkelijkheid waarin we leven wanneer de sociale wetenschap generatie op generatie belangrijke verhalen onverteld laat?



## Chapter 11 Science Education, Indoctrination, and the Hidden Curriculum

Lena Hansson

### 11.1 Introduction

Are students indoctrinated in science class? What could that mean? If yes, what kind of views are teachers indoctrinating students into? Is it possible to avoid? Is indoctrination a useful concept when trying to understand what is happening in the science classroom? Such issues will be of focus in this chapter. Historically there is no difference between the concept of indoctrination and the concept of teaching (Callan and Arena 2009; Gatchel 1972/2010; Green 1972). However, nowadays, indoctrination has negative connotations. It is not known exactly when this pejorative way to use the word began. However, Callan and Arena (2009, p. 120) provide an example from 1852 where indoctrination is positioned as something negative. However, different usage of the concept was used at the same time. Gatchel (1972/2010) writes that “little over half a century ago the employment of ‘indoctrination’ was no more offensive in educational circles than the use of ‘education’. Indeed, the two terms were practically synonymous” (p. 9). Green (1972) adds to this by referring to the *Oxford English Dictionary* published around 1900 that did not distinguish indoctrination from teaching. The definition of the concept of indoctrination, and how to distinguish it from teaching or from socialization, is discussed by philosophers of education. The risk of indoctrination has been frequently discussed in relation to religious and political education, but less frequently in science education. When used in science education, it has been in relation to teaching controversial value-based areas (for example in environmental education), as well as in relation to teaching the nature of science and specific scientific models. It has also been used in more general discussions of whether teaching science should aim towards knowledge or belief.

This chapter will take as a starting point, discussions of indoctrination in philosophy of education. The value of philosophy of education for science education research is highlighted by Schulz (2014). He states that debates on the aims of education as well as the difference between education and indoctrination are important for science education research. It is suggested in the literature that social and institutional structures should be taken into account when discussing indoctrination. In line with this Huttunen (2003) suggests that indoctrination can happen through the hidden curriculum (Snyder 1971). The chapter will discuss the possibility of using the concept of indoctrination in this way: in relation to

explicit and implicit messages in science class that are part of the hidden curriculum. Focus will be on the part of the hidden curriculum that communicates views about science itself – specific “nature of science” perspectives as well as specific worldviews and ideologies communicated side by side with science content in the science classroom (without necessarily being part of the formal curriculum).

### **11.2 Indoctrination: The Concept**

Indoctrination has long been a topic for analysis in the philosophy of education literature. Most teachers would feel attacked and offended if someone told them that they were indoctrinating students. Thus indoctrination has negative connotations for most people, including education scholars, teachers and the general public. The concept has generally come to mean the “unethical influencing in a teaching situation. Indoctrination means infiltrating (drilling, inculcating etc.) concepts, attitudes, beliefs and theories into a student’s mind by passing her free and critical deliberation” (Huttunen 2003, p. 1). Indoctrination, in this way, is a “systematic distortion of some kind in the teachers’ presentation of subject matter – a distortion that elicits, or could reasonably be expected to elicit, a corresponding distortion in the way students understand the subject matter” (Callan and Arena 2009, p. 105). In line with this, in the general use of the concept, there is a stark dichotomy between objectivity and indoctrination (Stolzenberg 1993). Thus, indoctrination nowadays is most often not viewed as something positive, but something that should be avoided. There are descriptions in the literature of how teachers navigate (and even exclude some aspects from their teaching) in fear of risking the indoctrination of students (Qablan et al. 2011). However, even if indoctrination is most often viewed as negative and to be avoided, some scholars argue that avoidance is not always possible (Moore 1972). In addition, there are scholars who argue that indoctrination can sometimes be justified, for example, in the moral education of very young children, or depending on high values at stake. Discussions include, for example, whether it would be justifiable to indoctrinate students into democratic values (e.g. Kilpatrick 1972) or critical thinking (e.g. Cuyper and Haji 2006).

A need is identified in the literature to define the concept of indoctrination more stringently to be able to decide whether a teacher is correctly accused of indoctrinating. Snook (1972/2010) offers a philosophical analysis of the concept in an attempt to define it with the starting point of four different criteria: the *methods* of teaching, the *content* of the teaching, the *consequences* of teaching, and the *intentions* of the teacher. These criteria are widely used among philosophers of education who have discussed the concept of indoctrination and how to understand the difference between indoctrination and teaching. However, scholars do not always agree on which (or which combination of) criterion should be decisive. There are scholars who argue for indoctrination being associated with specific *teaching methods* (e.g. Gatchel 1972/2010; Momanu 2012; Moore 1972/2010), for example, “the use of propaganda devices, including censorship” and “authoritarian methods” (Moore

1972/2010, pp. 93–94). Examples of authoritarian methods are when a teacher rewards the right answers and punishes with silence wrong answers, as well as not providing reasons for their claims (Bailey 2010, p. 276). Others argue that this criterion is not the most productive: “method is not a strong candidate as the criterion for indoctrination simply because it is extremely difficult to conceive of methods that are characteristic of indoctrination alone” (Bailey 2010, p. 276).

Also, *content* has been suggested as a possible decisive criterion. For example, there are arguments raised that only doctrines are possible to indoctrinate, or for defining a content based criterion in some other way (e.g. being about uncertain subject matters). Therefore, scholars arguing for the content criterion in different ways reason that there is a difference between consensus content and controversial content – where only controversial content could be subject for indoctrination. Flew (1972/2010) illustrates this by arguing for the difference between teaching controversial religious or political ideologies, and something like the multiplication tables. However, other scholars reject the notion of ideologies being the only content open for the possibility of indoctrination, for example, due to the difficulties with differing “between matters of broad consensus” and “contested claims” (Bailey 2010, p. 275). Green on the other hand, states that the difference between teaching and indoctrination “has nothing to do with the contents of beliefs” and refers that “two persons may hold to the same belief and yet one may do so evidentially and the other non-evidentially” (Green 1972, p. 33).

There are also scholars who discuss the *consequences* as a possible criterion for indoctrination. For example, Bailey (2010) discusses “closed-mindedness” (with reference to Laura (1983)) as a consequence of indoctrination while teaching is characterized by “open-mindedness”. Focus, in this way to characterise indoctrination, is the care about “students’ ability to judge for themselves” (Bailey 2010, p. 277), and about the autonomy of the student (Bailey 2010). A well-discussed criterion in the literature is the *intention* criterion, which many scholars argue for as the decisive criterion (e.g. Snook 1972/2010; White 1972/2010). Wilson (1972) states that indoctrination is an “intentional activity: you cannot indoctrinate by accident” (p. 18). The indoctrinator must “intend his pupil to arrive at a certain belief” (p. 18–19). Also, when presenting the four possible criteria (see above), Snook concludes that the intention criterion is the most useful of them all. He states that “A person cannot indoctrinate if he is not doing anything intentional at all: one cannot indoctrinate by omission” (Snook 1972, p. 66). He further states: ‘Indoctrination’ implies a pejorative judgment on a teaching situation. It suggests that someone taking advantage of a privileged role to influence those under his charge in a manner which is likely to distort their ability to assess the evidence on its own merit. The positive intention to bring about this state of mind is sufficient for the application of the term to his teaching, even if he should fail in his task.

(Snook 1972, p. 66). Thus a teacher's intention is central for Snook and many other scholars. However this position has been criticised, with arguments that it is not necessary that the teacher *intend* the student to believe *non-rationally*. Wilson (1972) writes that even though indoctrination is an "intentional activity", it is possible that the indoctrinator (e.g. the teacher responsible for the indoctrination) "might say, and believe, that they were helping people to form their own beliefs rationally and freely, but this might not be" (Wilson 1972, p. 18–19). Wilson argues that the teacher must "intend his pupil to arrive at a certain belief" for being held responsible for indoctrination, but it is not necessary that the indoctrinator intends this to happen non-rationally, for example, due to the authority of the teacher (Wilson 1972, p. 18–19). Snook (1972) widens the meaning of intention when including what is "*foreseen*" by the teacher: "Such a desire is not necessary, however, if it is foreseen that this state of mind is likely as a result of what is being done" (Snook 1972, p. 66).

Snook's philosophical analysis has been a starting point for other scholars' reasoning on indoctrination and education, such as Peterson (2007) who criticises the definition using the "foreseen" because it "does not allow us to accurately identify indoctrination. We cannot know with any degree of certainty what another person desires or foresees". Due to this she suggests that we add "*the foreseeable*" to the concept of intent.<sup>3</sup> However, she also emphasises the importance that indoctrination is caused by the actions of the teacher: "We ought only to hold teachers accountable for indoctrination if it is foreseeable that students would hold beliefs in a non-rational manner as a result of their teacher's actions" (Peterson 2007, p. 303). Thus, if the relation between the teacher's actions and the fact that students have come to hold beliefs in a non-rational manner cannot be established, then the teacher should not be accused. In this way "intent" has been widened to include actions that are not necessarily a result of the teacher's desire to indoctrinate, but where this consequence was foreseeable. Such actions can sometimes be best understood by taking the institutional level into account. The suggestion of taking also the institutional level into account will be returned to later in the chapter.

(.....)

### **11.5 The Hidden Curriculum in the Teaching of Science: A Focus on Images of Science**

The "hidden curriculum" concept was utilised by Snyder:

*I have found that a hidden curriculum determines, to a significant degree, what becomes the basis for all participants' sense of worth and self-esteem. It is this hidden curriculum, more than the formal curriculum, that influences the adaptation of students and faculty. ... Though each curriculum has characteristics that are special to the particular setting, the presence of these hidden curricula importantly affects the process of all education. The similarities in these hidden curricula are at least as important as the differences. (Snyder*

1971, xii–xiii)

This hidden curriculum could include how to master tasks given, how to communicate in science class, how to engage in laboratory work or problem solving, or how to attain high grades. Messages about these kinds of things, given by the teacher, are not always in line with the formal curriculum. Instead, there could be important differences between the formal curriculum and these other messages (the hidden curriculum) that influence life in the classroom. In science teaching, there are messages about science itself, which are communicated in the classroom, in textbooks or elsewhere, but are not necessarily in line with how the formal curriculum describes the subject – these messages could be viewed as part of the hidden curriculum. It could be specific worldviews and ideologies communicated in the science class and therefore, associated with science by the students, as well as specific nature of science perspectives. Stereotypic and mythical images of science could very well be communicated in the teaching of science, even though the formal curriculum perhaps puts forward other nature of science perspectives. These types of views about science are sometimes communicated explicitly, but often also implicitly in science class.

Schools can communicate a worldview through teaching in different ways, and two extreme cases can be seen (Proper et al. 1988). In one extreme, school explicitly presents and discusses a large variety of worldviews, while in the other extreme only a narrow span of worldviews is presented, and implicitly. The same could be said about possibilities for the communication of ideology as well as “nature of science” perspectives. In the second case (narrow span and implicit) it is relevant to discuss worldview (or ideology, or general nature of science perspectives) as part of the hidden curriculum (Kilbourn 1980). Often these worldviews, ideological perspectives, and nature of science perspectives are communicated implicitly as “companion meanings” (Roberts 1998). These companion meanings “can be either deliberately planned and incorporated in policy ... or ‘unintentional’ (as with gender bias, world view bias, cultural bias, and many others)” (Roberts 1998, p. 11). In line with this, Östman states that the teaching, through these kinds of companion meanings, is communicating a view about science, nature and the relation between humans and nature. To be able to see these companion meanings and be aware of their role, it is necessary to look for differences between the messages communicated and other possible alternative messages. This is done by noting what is not said, but could have been said (Östman 1998).

The examples given by Östman constitute examples of how views about science and specific worldviews are communicated in the teaching of science and become part of the hidden curriculum (see also Kilbourn 1980). Also, Fysh and Lucas (1998) discuss the problem with messages implicitly communicated about things not explicitly discussed in the teaching (in their case the relation between science and religion). Those implicit messages are important and students’ views about the values and presuppositions of science are formed by them. In

the extreme cases articulated by Proper and colleagues (1988) of how school science communicate worldviews, most such teaching is implicit rather than explicit. This means that even though science could be understood from the starting point of very different worldviews, ideologies and nature of science perspectives, this is most often not communicated in the science classroom. Here follow some examples.

### ***11.5.1 Messages About the Nature of Science as Part of the Hidden Curriculum***

Though often misunderstood in a way that makes a travesty of the pedagogical theory and practice of the founding positivists (Matthews 2004), logical positivism strongly influences much teaching of science (Aikenhead 2006). The above mentioned myths about science (McComas 1998) are reproduced in science classes through science concepts and models being presented as unchangeable, objective facts, and through traditional lab-work practices conveying images of a strict scientific method always being applicable. A large amount of research (see e.g. Lederman 2007) shows that students frequently express such views about the “nature of science” including, for example, that scientific research is an entirely rational, objective and universal enterprise, following the “scientific method” leading to absolute, objective facts about nature (Lederman 2007; McComas 1998). Communicating such a small span of nature of science perspectives in the classroom leaves no room for students to scrutinize different possibilities and positions. Of course, a positivistic view is possible to combine with science, but so are many other views. Despite that many different perspectives are possible – Alters (1998, p. 48) argues that “no one agreed-on NOS exists” – uniform images of science are communicated in most science classrooms. This uniform image most often leaves no room for discussing or problematizing different possible perspectives on the nature of science. Instead, it could be argued that such images of science are part of the hidden curriculum in many science classes.

### ***11.5.2 Messages About Worldview and Ideology as Part of the Hidden Curriculum***

The image of science communicated in science class could also include science being associated with specific worldviews, such as scientistic (Stenmark 2004) and atheistic worldviews. Taber (2013, p. 153) states that “there is much potential for the image of science offered to pupils to be scientistic”; while Hansson and Redfors (2007a, b) and Hansson and Lindahl (2010, 2015) show that students often associate scientistic and atheistic views about the world with science. The question of how science is related to worldview has been discussed by scholars with different disciplinary backgrounds (see Matthews 2014, 2015, chap.10) and contributions to Matthews 2009). That there are different views concerning science and worldview is consistent with scholars having different views on other nature-of-science related issues. Cobern (1991, 2000a) describes how scientists could be viewed to have some presuppositions about the world in common, but these presuppositions do not in themselves constitute a worldview. Instead these

presuppositions are combined with others that differ between different scientists. Taber (2013) exemplifies how in this way it is possible to understand science with the starting point in different worldviews. This is, however, most often not communicated in the science class. Instead, frequently, a narrow span of worldviews is communicated, and taken for granted, in science class. In addition, school science also communicates ideological perspectives. Fourez (1988) discussed ideology in relation to the teaching of science, stating that all science teaching is marked by ideology, but that there is often a large unawareness of this. Fourez gives an example of a teacher who argues that in his text book there is no ideology, only science. However, independent of the teacher's unawareness of the communication of ideology in the teaching of science, such messages are always there implicitly, in the teaching and in the text book (Fourez 1988). These messages will influence students' images of science. For example, there are scholars who argue that school science most often communicates modernistic and technology optimistic agendas (see above). However, these are not the only possible ideological starting points for engagement in science, and again the images communicated of science are narrow.

In the science class, often only a narrow span of worldviews, ideology, and nature of science perspectives are communicated and therefore tend to be associated with science by the students. Due to this students are not given access to different perspectives from which science can be understood. This specific narrow span is often not part of the formal curriculum, but something that influences what is happening in the science classrooms and how science is understood by students. These messages could be viewed as part of the hidden curriculum in many science classes around the world.

### **11.6 Indoctrination in Science Class Through the Hidden Curriculum**

Huttunen (2003) suggests that indoctrination is not always the intent of the teacher, but that it could be fruitful to think of indoctrination as something that also happens due to institutional structures, through the hidden curriculum. The hidden curriculum includes a lot of different aspects, and the ones focused on here are messages communicated about science itself – messages that most often are not part of the formal curriculum but nevertheless have great impact on students' images of science. For example, there are plenty of examples in the literature showing how science teaching communicates messages about science being a body of unchangeable, objective, universal facts; science being the same thing as scientism and science being associated with modernism (see above). These views are so frequent among teachers and students that they could be viewed as part of a hidden curriculum shared by many science classes around the world. Teachers and students are part of the social structures reproducing these images of science. While it would have been possible to communicate a wide span of perspectives in respect of worldviews, ideologies and nature of science perspectives, this is most often not what is happening. Instead, only a narrow span of perspectives are presented to the students, and frequently

this is also done implicitly (Proper et al. 1988). It could be argued that these taken-for-granted and unproblematised messages constitute an attempt to indoctrinate students. In such a classroom where only a narrow span of perspectives is communicated, science is distorted for the students.

In these cases, it is not necessarily about teachers wanting to indoctrinate students (most teachers have good intentions), but something that happens unintentionally through the hidden curriculum (Huttunen 2003). Due to this, the traditional intention criterion is not fulfilled. However, it could be argued, in line with what Huttunen suggests, that teachers – as part of the school science institution – have used their “privileged role to influence those under his charge in a manner which is likely to distort their ability to assess the evidence on its own merit” (Snook 1972, p. 66). However, this may not always be the intention of the teacher. Also the teacher could have been indoctrinated into associating science with for example positivistic, scientific and modernistic views. Not knowing what they are doing, the teachers contribute to a reproduction of the association between science and these specific perspectives on science. This distorts science for these indoctrinated students, who lose their possibility to engage in science with the starting point in their own ideological and worldview perspectives. Hansson and Lindahl (2010) shows how students’ relations to science (good or bad) could partly be understood from such differences between students’ own worldviews and the type of worldview they associate with science. Huttunen considers: content that limits students’ meaning perspectives and minimizes as opposed to increases students’ own power of judgement as indoctrinative. ... The non-indoctrinative teaching content gives students both the freedom and faculty to determine their own differentiated identity, worldview and conduct of life. (Huttunen 2003, p. 13). Thus, not problematizing and discussing different nature of science perspectives as well as science in relation to worldview and ideology, but instead only implicitly communicating a narrow span of views, indeed, according to this definition of the concept, is indoctrination. Thus, it is indoctrination both with the starting point in the content criterion (controversial content being communicated as non-controversial), and the consequence criterion (the teaching limits, rather than broadens, students’ meaning perspectives).

Taking the hidden curricula into account, much science teaching could be viewed as an attempt to indoctrinate students into specific views about science, even though most teachers have no such intent. That the result of such teaching would be indoctrination is foreseeable, due to the large body of literature on students’ views upon science. However, the one responsible for this indoctrination through the hidden curriculum is not only the teacher (who might have no intention of indoctrinating students), but the whole system (for which it is foreseeable that much teaching today is guilty of indoctrinating students into very specific views about science). Thus, it is the system as a whole that should be held guilty of indoctrinating students in science classes. This includes teachers, but also textbook authors,

curriculum developers, teacher education and science education researchers – who all are part of this indoctrination. All should do their part to counteract this pattern.

# Invisibility of Racial/Ethnic Minorities in Developmental Science: Implications for Research and Institutional Practices

Moin Syed  
University of Minnesota

Carlos Santos  
University of California, Los Angeles

Hyung Chol Yoo  
Arizona State University

Linda P. Juang  
University of Potsdam

García Coll et al.'s (1996) integrative model was a landmark article for developmental science, and for psychology more broadly, in outlining the multitude of social and cultural factors at play when seeking to understand the development of racial/ethnic minority children. The time is ripe to not only take stock of those advances but also evaluate the integrative model in the context of present-day research practice within developmental psychology, and psychology more broadly. The purpose of this article is to bring a systemic perspective to developmental science through a discussion of current practices in the field. To do so, we examine *invisibility*, or how dominant practices serve to overlook, silence, or dismiss knowledge produced by and for racial/ethnic minority populations. Guided by the interpretive framework of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991), we discuss three key questions: From whose vantage point is research conducted? What types of questions are valued? And who gets left out? We then conclude with recommendations for changes in practices for individuals, institutions, and the field at large. Importantly, although our analysis is largely grounded in research and practices in developmental psychology, it is also highly relevant to psychological science as a whole.

*Keywords:* developmental psychology, race/ethnicity, intersectionality, invisibilities

The historical exclusion of racial/ethnic minorities from the science of psychology has been well documented (Graham, 1992; Richards, 1997; Winston, 2004). Developmental

psychologists have been on the forefront of attempts to rectify this disparity in research focus, bringing attention to the conditions, circumstances, and life experiences of racial/ethnic minority children and adolescents. García Coll et al.'s (1996) integrative model for the study of developmental competencies in minority children is one of the most influential scholarly works in this regard, as it outlined the multitude of social and cultural factors at play when seeking to understand the development of minority children. Since the development of this model, there has been an increase in the breadth and sophistication of research on the development of racial/ethnic minority children (Quintana et al., 2006), covering such topics as how character strengths (e.g., ethnic identity; Umaña-Taylor et al., 2014) and promotive environments (e.g., racial socialization; Hughes et al., 2006), among many other topics, can facilitate positive development.

It is clear that there have been advances in understanding the contexts of racial/ethnic minority development in terms of the subjects of our research. There have not been concomitant advances, however, in understanding developmental psychology, or psychology more broadly, from a sys-

---

*Editor's note.* This article is part of a special issue, "New Directions in Developmental Science With Youth Experiencing Marginalization," published in the September, 2018 issue of *American Psychologist*. José M. Causadias and Adriana J. Umaña-Taylor served as guest editors of the special issue, with Jacquelynne S. Eccles as advisory editor.

---

*Authors' note.* Moin Syed, Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota; Carlos Santos, Department of Social Welfare, University of California, Los Angeles; Hyung Chol Yoo, School of Social Transformation & Sanford School of Social and Family Dynamics, Arizona State University; Linda P. Juang, Department of Education, University of Potsdam.

Ideas expressed in this article originated from the panel session "Colorblindness in Psychological Sciences: Overcoming Institutional Barriers," presented at the Meeting of 20th Anniversary of García Coll and colleagues' (1996) "An Integrative Model for the Study of Developmental Competencies in Minority Children," Tempe, Arizona, February 4–5, 2016. We thank five anonymous reviewers for comments that helped further shape the article.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Moin Syed, Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota, 75 East River Road, Minneapolis, MN 55455. E-mail: [moin@umn.edu](mailto:moin@umn.edu)



### Moin Syed

temic perspective. That is, not only have racial/ethnic minority individuals been historically excluded from research studies—their presence and perspectives have often been excluded from the ranks of those doing the research, perpetuating a sense of *invisibility* within the field.

The purpose of the present analysis is to raise attention to this invisibility by bringing a systemic perspective to developmental science. Our analysis is guided by merging the integrative model with the interpretive framework of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991), which draws attention to how social structures create and maintain multiple forms of overlapping oppression (see also Cole, 2009). This merger leads us to discuss three key questions for developmental science: From whose vantage point is research conducted? What types of questions are valued? And who gets left out? We grapple with these questions while reflecting on the content and promise of the integrative model and consider if, how, and why it has or has not moved the field of developmental science to be more inclusive. We then conclude with recommendations for changes in practices for individuals, institutions, and the field at large that correspond to these three questions. Our primary intent in this article is to draw attention to important systemic concerns and raise awareness among the psychology community. We hope to get readers thinking as opposed to providing firm answers or resolutions to these very complex issues. Importantly, although our analysis is largely grounded in research and practices in developmental psychology, it is also relevant to psychological science as a whole and thus draws from other areas of psychology.

### The Integrative Model in a Systemic Context

The genesis of the integrative model for the study of developmental competencies in minority children (García Coll et al., 1996) was motivated by the fact that existing models of development, even models considered to be “contextual,” failed to adequately account for the unique experiences of racial/ethnic minority youth (e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 1979). Accordingly, the integrative model specifies three families of factors—*social position* (race, ethnicity, social class, gender), *social stratification mechanisms* (racism in all its forms), and *segregation* (residential, economic, social, and psychological)—as constituting a set of factors that the authors described as “nonshared” with racial/ethnic majority populations. These factors have a causal influence on developmental competencies through their effect on the “shared” factors of promoting and inhibiting environments, adaptive culture, child factors, and family factors. Although García Coll et al. (1996) made a clear distinction between the nonshared and shared factors, in reality all of the factors are shared, but the nonshared factors disproportionately impact minority youth in a negative way. Indeed, the lack of attention to these nonshared factors was the impetus for the development of the model, indicating that even though they are more accurately conceptualized as shared, they had not been treated as centrally important in work with majority youth. The model clearly struck a chord with a new generation of scholars seeking a more inclusive developmental science, as is evident from the current special issue commemorating the 20th anniversary of the article.

Our primary purpose is not to evaluate the wealth of research inspired by the integrative model but to expand and apply the model to a new problem. Fitting with the disciplinary emphasis of psychology, the model was intended to serve as a framework for understanding individual-level processes within the U.S. sociocultural context. Nevertheless, we argue that the model can also be used to understand the broader context in which developmental science itself has been conducted. That is, the model can be used to advance a *systemic* understanding as well as an individual one. Conducting a systemic analysis of developmental science, however, requires additional concepts and analytic tools beyond what was included in the original integrative model.

### Expanding the Conceptual Terrain of the Integrative Model: The Ideological Setting of Developmental Science

Psychology as a discipline is defined by its focus on *individual* organisms. Although there are some subdisciplines, such as areas of social, organizational, and community psychology, that have a richer tradition of moving beyond the individual to examine structural factors, by and large, the focus remains on individual processes and out-



**Carlos Santos**

comes. Recent scholarship in narrative psychology—specifically, work on master narratives—has attempted to bridge this divide by bringing greater attention to the importance of the *ideological setting* in which individuals develop (Hammack, 2008; McAdams, 2006; McLean & Syed, 2015). Whereas individuals hold personal ideologies, ideological settings are the broader societal-level beliefs and values that underlie a normative life in a given context.

In the United States, normative ideology flows directly from the strongly held values of equal opportunity, meritocracy, and dispositionalism, embodied by the master narrative of the American Dream (Hochschild, 1996; Syed, 2016).<sup>1</sup> This ideological setting minimizes the role of structural explanations for both success and struggle, locating them within individuals rather than their contexts. Moreover, the associated belief that anyone can succeed if they work hard enough implies that the social position variables (e.g., race/ethnicity) highlighted by García Coll et al. (1996) are not, and should not, be relevant—an ideology known as *racial colorblindness*. An important conceptual implication of ideological settings is that individuals within the setting will internalize and embody the normative ideology (McLean & Syed, 2015). Of course, individuals are not passive recipients of normative ideology, but from a structural perspective, it is imperative to understand the force the ideological setting can take on. Indeed, because the values and practices embedded within society at large are evident within our accumulated evidence and ongoing practices (Harris & González, 2012), we argue that developmental psychology (and psychology more broadly) as a field reflects and reproduces racial colorblindness.

Racial colorblindness has been studied extensively as a psychological construct, largely as an individually held attitude of the dominant, White majority (see Rosenthal & Levy, 2010, for a review). For example, Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, and Browne (2000) defined colorblind racial ideology as the denial, distortion, and minimization of race and racism in the United States to maintain the racial status quo and White superiority. However, our use of the term *racial colorblindness* is more closely aligned with the sociological approach that goes beyond the individual level, describing its significance as an ideological setting (e.g., Bonilla-Silva, 2015). Racial colorblindness as an ideological setting follows from a racially stratified society and “results in ‘raceless’ explanations for all sort of race-related affairs” (Bonilla-Silva, 2015, p. 1364), such as school and residential segregation, educational advancement, and wealth accumulation. This tendency can be seen in a wide variety of research in developmental psychology, for example, in racial comparative designs that often attribute developmental delays to presumed deficiencies of members of minority groups (Cauce, Coronado, & Watson, 1998), and in the use of race/ethnicity as an independent variable without also including assessments of the putative underlying process that would account for any observed differences between White and ethnic minority youth (e.g., socioeconomic differences, differential access to opportunity; see Gjerde, 2004; Helms, Jernigan, & Mascher, 2005). These issues have been discussed extensively in the literature, and we encourage interested readers to consult the preceding citations for more information. Our concern here is on the ideological setting in which research is conducted, and the corresponding broader values and beliefs that undergird our research practice.

### Expanding the Analytic Toolbox: Intersectionality as an Analytic Lens

Scholarship on the interpretive framework of *intersectionality* has received increasing attention in recent years across numerous disciplines, including in psychology (Cole, 2009; Rosenthal, 2016). Intersectionality was developed and refined by Black feminists, women of color, and queer activists/scholars who challenged single identity politics in the U.S. civil rights movement, contributing the critical insight that systemic inequalities overlap in the lives of individuals (Collins, 1989; Combahee River Collective, 1977/1983; Crenshaw, 1991; see Moradi & Grzanka, 2017). As it emerged outside of psychology, intersectionality was originally (and continues to be) an interpretive framework

<sup>1</sup> It should be obvious that ideological settings are culturally specific. For example, in many European countries, the ideology flows from the belief in national homogeneity versus success through self-sufficiency (Gogolin, 2002).



**Hyung Chol Yoo**

for understanding societal processes and not individual psychological processes per se (Crenshaw, 1991; see Syed & Ajayi, in press). Using intersectionality to develop a systemic application of the integrative model involves an analysis of power dynamics and how multiple interlocking systems of oppression and affordances—beyond and within race and ethnicity—are associated with our research and institutional practices.

This perspective gained prominence in legal studies (Crenshaw, 1991), serving as an analytic lens for understanding representation and how broad social systems are conceptualized. Cole (2009) applied an intersectional approach to psychology, posing three questions pertaining to issues of research design and analysis (e.g., sample inclusion, interpretations). As Cole described, an analysis of power dynamics must lay at the core, rather than the periphery, of an inquiry into the development of both racial/ethnic minority and majority youth. Taking this approach merges the systems focus of intersectionality within the individual empirical orientation of psychology. Indeed, research in developmental science has attempted to grapple with how individuals engage with systemic inequalities (e.g., Diemer & Li, 2011). Although this work is noteworthy, it still relies on individual-level analyses. Our focus here is not on understanding structures for individual development but understanding the structure surrounding the research being conducted.

In the present analysis, we use the analytic framework of intersectionality to understand racial colorblindness as an ideological setting in developmental science. Bringing an intersectional approach to colorblindness as an ideological setting brings attention to our core concept in this article:

how *invisibilities* are created and maintained in the field. Racial colorblindness as a concept implies invisibility, as it corresponds to a minimization of race as an important factor in the lives of minority and majority individuals; it seeks to make race invisible. At the same time, invisibility has been a strong contribution of psychological interpretations of intersectionality. *Intersectional invisibility* is a concept developed to bring attention to how our systems and dominant ways of thinking can lead to certain social identities and oppressions to be rendered invisible (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; see also Ghavami & Peplau, 2013). We build upon this definition by inserting racial colorblindness as the core system, or ideological setting, that creates and sustains the invisibilities of racial/ethnic minorities in developmental science.

Invisibilities can clearly be seen in the broader research base constituting developmental science (McLloyd, 2006; Quintana et al., 2006), which was the impetus for García Coll et al.'s (1996) integrative model in the first place. The invisibility of racial/ethnic minorities has been well-documented through several content analyses of journals. In their review of articles published in American Psychological Association (APA) and Association for Psychological Science journals between 1993 and 1999, Nagayama Hall and Maramba (2001) found that only 6% of articles overall, and only 3% of articles in *Developmental Psychology*—arguably the leading APA journal focused on developmental science—focused on racial/ethnic minorities. Hartmann et al. (2013) conducted the same analysis for the period 2003 to 2009 and found little evidence for change, with 4% of all articles, and 7% of articles in *Developmental Psychology*, focused on racial/ethnic minorities. Focusing only on sample composition of three developmental journals between 2006 and 2010 (*Developmental Psychology*, *Child Development*, and *Developmental Science*), Nielsen, Haun, Kärtner, and Legare (2017)<sup>2</sup> found that 14% of articles included samples that were predominantly racial/ethnic minority, and a surprisingly high 28% did not mention racial/ethnic composition at all. Taken together, these analyses document the invisibility of racial/ethnic minority samples in developmental research and show no signs of major change over time. Thus, although the integrative model may have helped contribute to understanding more of the complexities of racial/ethnic minority development (see Quintana et al., 2006), it does not seem to have contributed to a major increase in the proportion of studies focusing on racial/ethnic minority youth.

Importantly, the emphasis on invisibility should not be taken as an endorsement of racial/ethnic minority youth as passive, or as the seeds of a deficit-oriented research agenda. Individuals and researchers who are marginalized

<sup>2</sup> These specific data were not detailed in the published report but were provided by M. Nielsen via personal communication, September 13, 2017.



**Linda P. Juang**

have agency and respond to the issue of invisibilities in a variety of ways that are powerful and meaningful—they *actively resist* their invisibilities and fight to gain visibility (e.g., through the generation of special issues of journals, special topics meetings). We will highlight examples of such resistance but also obstacles to resistance. In sum, adopting an intersectional analysis and considering the ideological setting in which the integrative model is situated facilitates an expansion of the model to the systemic level, bringing awareness to ongoing invisibilities in the field.

### A Systemic View on Developmental Science

What does a systemic view of developmental science mean? Most centrally, a systemic view implies that we consider not only our research findings in substantive terms but also broader issues pertaining to the research context itself. This includes how research is conducted, who is doing the research, the opportunities for conducting and disseminating research, and the incentive system that rewards research and productivity. We argue that understanding the context in which developmental research is carried out is intricately connected to what we “know” about developmental phenomena. In this section we expand on our analytic framework, followed by an examination of major issues that serve as obstacles to pursuing a productive and inclusive developmental science, and a more inclusive psychological science more broadly.

Merging an intersectional perspective with the [García Coll et al. \(1996\)](#) integrative model yields new and important questions about how developmental science is conducted vis-à-vis diversity. In particular, the trio of factors in

the model that had been underrepresented in developmental science—social positions, social stratification mechanisms, and segregation—can be used to generate questions about the field as a whole, not just individual development. Consistent with our intersectional approach to understanding racial colorblindness as an ideological setting, our emphasis throughout the remainder of the article is on the invisibilities created through our current research practice. Following the intersectional analytic device of posing questions to interrogate social systems (e.g., [Cole, 2009](#)), we generated three questions about invisibilities that correspond to the three nonshared factors of the integrative model: (a) *social position*—from whose vantage points is research conducted?; (b) *social stratification*—what types of questions are valued?; and (c) *segregation*—who gets left out from our work? In the following sections we expand on each question and how it aligns with the corresponding factor of the integrative model. Collectively, the questions raise major issues concerning how we conduct our science—questions that all psychologists would do well to consider.

### Social Position: From Whose Vantage Point Is Research Conducted?

Given the origins of empirical psychology in Western Europe and the United States, it is hardly surprising that the mainstream perspective in the field represents beliefs, views, and interests valued by the dominant members of those cultures. Examinations of the samples included in research across psychology bears this out, overwhelmingly comprising White, American, middle-class<sup>3</sup> samples ([Arnett, 2008](#); [Graham, 1992](#); [Nagayama Hall & Maramba, 2001](#); [Hartmann et al., 2013](#); [Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010](#); [Nielsen et al., 2017](#)). The result is a theoretical and empirical base that reflects a very small percentage of the world’s population. In the integrative model, this invisibility of racial/ethnic minority populations is captured by the *social position* factor, which brings attention to social identity memberships (e.g., race, gender, social class) as well as attitudes and beliefs about the self and other. These social group memberships are the very ones that are minimized within a colorblind ideological setting. As we describe, social position in a systemic context is manifest as invisibility with respect to both *bodies* and *perspectives*.

**Invisibility of bodies.** Invisibility of bodies pertains most directly to *representation*. At the most fundamental level, representation can be considered in terms of number of bodies, that is, a count of researchers from racial/ethnic minority groups with faculty appointments. On this metric, things look bleak. African Americans, Latinx, Asian Amer-

<sup>3</sup> Samples have also likely comprised heterosexual, cisgendered, able-bodied, native-born, linguistic-majority, and religious-majority participants, but researchers do not often collect this information.

icans, and Native Americans continue to be underrepresented in the academy relative to their proportion in the U.S. population; 22% of professors in the United States are racial/ethnic minorities, whereas 42% of university students are racial/ethnic minorities (Kena et al., 2016). Representations are even smaller for women and faculty of color being promoted to full professorship (Stanley, 2006). In 2013, among full professors, 58% were White males, 26% were White females, 2% were Black males, 1% were Black females, 2% were Latinx males, 1% were Latinx females, 7% were Asian/Pacific Islander males, and 2% were Asian/Pacific Islander females. Making up less than 1% each were professors who were American Indian/Alaska Native and of two or more races (Kena et al., 2016). Furthermore, research on campus diversity rarely obtains information about faculty members' sexual orientation or gender identity, so representation of gender diverse and sexual minorities, and how they intersect with race/ethnicity, are unknown.

Specifically in the field of psychology, racial/ethnic minority faculty represented only 10% in 1999 to 2000 (APA, 2000), and 13% in 2008 to 2009 (APA, 2010), of the total faculty responding from graduate departments of psychology in the United States. Data on awarded doctorates indicate greater prevalence and change over time: 18% of doctoral recipients in psychology were racial/ethnic minorities in 1995, whereas this number had increased to 28% by 2015 (National Science Foundation, 2017). In that year, the field of development psychology was slightly more diverse than psychology as a whole, with 34% of degree recipients being racial/ethnic minorities. Taken together with the faculty numbers, however, suggests that the increase in racial/ethnic minority doctorates has not necessarily led to a proportionate increase in racial/ethnic minority faculty.

With the invisibility of racial/ethnic minority faculty also comes the invisibility of unique stressors encountered by these faculty (Vasquez et al., 2006). Because most research-intensive universities are predominantly White institutions, faculty of color often indicate alienation, overt and covert discrimination, and a devaluing of their research (e.g., Delgado Bernal, Elenes, Godinez, & Villenas, 2006). Individuals who belong to multiple marginalized groups (e.g., queer persons of color, women of color) are especially vulnerable to tokenism (double representation) and feeling burdened, with disproportionately more nurturing service responsibilities (e.g., mentoring students) and expected to serve on more cultural and diversity related committees than other faculty (Brayboy, 2003; Syed, 2017). They may also feel delegitimized by colleagues and students when they are questioned about their credibility and competence (Pittman, 2010). These issues can often lead faculty who occupy these social positions, as noted in the integrative model, to feel socially isolated, marginalized, and invisible (Stanley, 2006). Within a colorblind ideological setting, issues of race, class, gender, and sexuality, which frame a scholar's

experience within the academy, are continually overlooked, unchallenged, and unmonitored on a systemic level, rendering faculties of color invisible (Stanley, 2006).

The issue of *bodies of representation* is complicated by the fact that attention to invisibilities in one dimension of diversity can potentially create different invisibilities. The current focus on racial/ethnic minority panethnic group representation at the center of diversifying bodies in academia ignores other types of diversity (e.g., sexual identity, disability status, nationality, and so on, and their intersections) that are needed in developmental science. For example, the current editorial boards of the *Journal of Research on Adolescence*, the flagship journal of the Society for Research on Adolescence, as well as *Developmental Psychology*, the flagship developmental journal of the APA, are composed entirely of scholars from the United States despite the fact that they are diverse in other ways. *Child Development* is better in this regard, with 40% of the editorial board coming from outside the United States. This is not to say that all editorial boards, departments, and so on, must perfectly represent all different intersections of subordinated identities, but rather how attention to some aspects of diversity can sometimes come at the expense of others.

Of course, representation goes beyond bodies. This argument has been used in support of the belief that increasing representation of individuals who care about diversity is a sufficient response, regardless of their race/ethnicity. We disagree with the practice of relying on this assertion to justify the chronic exclusion of individuals who belong to underrepresented groups. On the other hand, if diversity is measured and represented simply by a body count, this does not ensure diverse views when operating within an oppressive system, in which researchers are trained in the dominant way of thinking (Sue, 1999). In other words, being a racial/ethnic minority individual does not automatically ensure attention to minority issues.

**Invisibility of perspectives.** As articulated in the integrative model, social position includes not only social identity group memberships but also the attitudes and beliefs associated with those groups (García Coll et al., 1996). Psychology is dominated by a particular perspective or vantage point that not only guides the field but also works to maintain the invisibility of marginalized racial/ethnic perspectives. This dominant vantage point is rooted in colorblind ideology, at best, in its passive form of simply ignoring racial/ethnic minority voices and, at worst, in actively excluding them (Syed, 2017). Accordingly, the dominant vantage point fails to capture interlocking systems of privilege and oppression, further promoting intersecting invisibilities.

One way to see this process in action is to examine mainstream advancements in studying culture and diversity. For instance, Markus and Kitayama's (1991) articulation of independent and interdependent self-construals has been a

hugely influential model (cited over 18,000 times), seeking to highlight the limitations of the universalist thinking of psychology, and social psychology in particular. But this highly oversimplified dichotomous way of thinking about selves was easily accommodated by a universalist perspective; it did not require any change to the thinking about psychological processes among those using samples from the United States and Europe, save for, perhaps, limits on the perceived generalizability of the findings (see also Shweder, 2000, on why cross-cultural psychology is more widely accepted than cultural psychology). Moreover, although the article brought attention to potential cultural factors, it said little about racial/ethnic diversity.

Similarly, Henrich et al.'s (2010) article on the overreliance of WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) samples makes essentially no reference to race/ethnicity as a potential limiting factor of past study designs. The article has made a huge impact, garnering over 3,000 citations in just over 7 years, and yet largely works in the same way as Markus and Kitayama (1991), in that it specifies boundary conditions for generalizability more than bringing attention to persistent invisibilities. Thus, even when there is an opening to new ways of thinking about diversity in psychological processes, such an opening can paradoxically serve to reinforce the existing vantage points and maintain the invisibility of racial/ethnic minorities. Furthermore, citation counts suggest that psychological researchers are much more willing to accept and incorporate limitations of their fields with respect to cultural/national representation than they are with respect to racial/ethnic representation. For example, Graham's (1992) article, "Most of the Subjects Were White and Middle Class: Trends in Published Research on African Americans in Selected APA Journals, 1970–1989," published in *American Psychologist* around the same time as Markus and Kitayama and well before Henrich et al., has been cited only 620 times, compared with 18,588 and 3,657, respectively. These data speak to the field of psychology at large, and not developmental psychology specifically, but they say something about the broader context of the field, and there is little reason to believe that developmentalists are exempt from this context.

The historic and ongoing exclusion of research with racial/ethnic minority populations means that there are substantial gaps in our knowledge of core developmental issues. These gaps include understanding how existing research on psychological processes conducted with White samples applies to racial/ethnic minority populations. For example, research on the timing and meaning of family conflict among White parents and adolescents has long assumed that early adolescence is when we see the highest level of conflict (Laursen, Coy, & Collins, 1998), followed by decreases into young adulthood (Whiteman, McHale, & Crouter, 2011), and that parent–adolescent conflict during

adolescence is developmentally appropriate and normative. In contrast, for Chinese American adolescents, parent–adolescent conflict may peak during mid-adolescence, not early adolescence (Juang, Hou, Douglass Bayless, & Kim, 2017), and rather than the usual portrayal of parent–adolescent conflict as damaging to relationships among immigrant families, some family conflict during adolescence is also developmentally appropriate (see Juang, Syed, Cookston, Wang, & Kim, 2012). Thus, in this case, inclusion of diverse populations in our research challenges our views of what is "normative" for certain populations.

The gaps in developmental knowledge also consist of constructs and processes that were underexamined or overlooked entirely because of the focus on racial/ethnic majority populations. For example, although the construct of socialization has a long history in developmental psychology (Grusec, 2011), only relatively recently have researchers begun to study cultural socialization, or how parents, peers, and other agents transmit messages regarding ethnicity and race to their children (and vice versa; Hughes et al., 2006). This is a major oversight, as Garcia Coll et al.'s (1996) model shows that race/ethnicity and related experiences such as segregation, racism, and discrimination are central to racial/ethnic minority child development. As such, ignoring how parenting develops and operates in relation to these issues misses a key piece of parent–child relationships.

Despite the lack of mainstream psychological attention, there are alternative views that have worked to expose the invisibility of racial/ethnic minority issues just as the integrative model intended. For example, ethnic minority psychology (or multicultural psychology; Hall, Yip, & Zárate, 2016) is a field that is dedicated to understanding culturally relevant processes among racial/ethnic minorities, and is thereby a clear rejection of the colorblind ideology. Empirical studies examine a wide range of coping strategies and resiliency developed by youth of color and their families to navigate, negotiate, and resist discrimination (Hughes et al., 2006; Quintana et al., 2006; Umaña-Taylor et al., 2014), as well as how they engage with the broader society in terms of sociopolitical development, critical consciousness, and activism (e.g., Diemer & Li, 2011).

But, as noted, this research largely operates outside of the mainstream of developmental psychology. Hartmann et al.'s (2013, Table 2) content analysis of journal articles published in 2003 and 2009 clearly indicated that most research focused on racial/ethnic minorities was published in either medical journals or in specialty journals dedicated to research on those populations (e.g., *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology*, *Journal of Black Psychology*, *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*). One striking counterexample is *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, which has a relatively high number of articles on racial/ethnic minorities, both in the absolute sense ( $N = 144$ ) and

relative to the total number of publications (28%). These numbers are much higher than for *Developmental Psychology* ( $N = 52$  and 7%). Importantly, some caution is warranted when interpreting journal content within a relatively circumscribed timeline. McLloyd (2006) carefully detailed the history of the editorial board of *Child Development*, describing how the content of the journal pertaining to racial/ethnic minorities changed along with editorial transitions. Indeed, in 2014 the journal instituted a “sociocultural policy,” meaning that authors are now required to provide detailed information about samples when theoretically relevant. As this policy mandates reporting rather than inclusion in the study design, it is difficult to know what impact, if any, it will have. Nevertheless, these types of institutional changes are precisely what are needed to initiate changes to current practice.

### Social Stratification Mechanisms: What Types of Questions Are Valued?

In the integrative model, *social stratification mechanisms* serve as the central mediator between social position and contexts of racial/ethnic minority youth development. García Coll and colleagues (1996) specify these mechanisms as racism, discrimination, and prejudice—clearly all variations of the theme of differential access to power within a racially stratified society. This factor of social stratification is already conceptualized at the systemic level, facilitating applications to the field of developmental science. We define social stratification in the research context as the types of research questions and topics that are valued, as those questions that are more culturally valued are also those that are more likely to be favorably reviewed for journals and grants—two major indicators of success and prestige (see Sternberg, 2016, for evidence of these values). Our intersectionality-inspired analytic approach leads us to focus on issues of power and social structures in terms of how “value” is conceptualized. We provide examples of how these valued questions (e.g., agency-based and biological models) are derived from the colorblind ideological setting, lead to further invisibilities of racial/ethnic minorities, and how differences in values have led to both gaps in knowledge and more long-term delays in cumulative knowledge.

The individual-focused tendency that flows from the racial colorblind ideological setting is reflected in the types of research that gain broad popular national and international recognition. Two prominent examples—one from developmental psychology and one from personality psychology—are both agency-based models that have implications for educational policy and practice. Research on the benefits of developing a growth mindset for academic success focuses on individual cognitions and interactions between children and teachers/parents (Dweck, 2006). However, interven-

tions aimed at fostering growth mindsets do nothing to change the structure of the educational system, so do not engage with critical issues associated with educational disparities, such as ability grouping (“tracking”), disciplinary norms, and funding. Similarly, *grit*, which is the passion and perseverance linked to academic success (Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007), is conceptualized as a personality trait (and is indistinguishable from conscientiousness; Credé, Tynan, & Harms, 2017). Thus, interventions seeking to foster grit are dispositionally based rather than systemic. Grit, too, is interesting in that it so nicely aligns with the “success through hard work” component of the American Dream master narrative. This point can be generalized to the broader valuing of the concept of agency throughout psychology, and the general failure to contextualize agency within overlapping systems of oppression and privilege (see Whaley, 2009, for a similar critique of stereotype threat research). Thus, when considering the ideological setting in which the research was produced and disseminated, it is little surprise that growth mindset, grit, and other agency-based concepts have taken hold.

The current research zeitgeist in developmental psychology (and psychology more broadly; Schwartz, Lilienfeld, Meca, & Sauvigné, 2016) on biological processes is a contemporary example of the ongoing barriers to the advancement of racial/ethnic minority psychology. Schwartz et al. (2016) documented shifts in federal funding priorities, research design choices, and hiring practices toward biological perspectives on psychological issues. However, the legacy of scientific racism has led to skepticism about biological research with racial/ethnic minority groups (Rowley & Camacho, 2015). Identifying genetic markers or neural processes associated with psychological processes that differentiate minority and majority groups, especially in terms of race, runs the risk of such differences being interpreted as natural, innate, and unchangeable (Gould & Heine, 2012). Accordingly, both researchers and potential participants may be hesitant to engage in such research. Because this work is highly valued in the field, in terms of available jobs and grants (Schwartz et al., 2016), not engaging in this work places racial/ethnic minorities at a disadvantage relative to their majority peers. Of course, this is not the case across the board—there has been an emergence of research examining cultural and biological levels of analysis (see volume by Causadias, Telzer, & Gonzales, 2018), but nevertheless, many concerns about this approach remain.

The preference for certain types of questions over others also leads to gaps in our knowledge, even in areas of research most relevant to minority groups, such as the study of racial/ethnic discrimination. It was not until the end of World War II when there was a more conscious recognition and discussion of racial/ethnic biases and discrimination, which led researchers to shift from research questions supporting scientific racism to asking why, how, and when

individuals were racist at the individual level (Richards, 1997). The subsequent research led to a cumulative body of knowledge of how racist views, mostly among Whites, were formed and maintained in relation to individual differences (e.g., authoritarian personality), and cognitive, affective, and group processes (Fiske, 1998). During this time, there was little theoretical and empirical attention to the history of race and racism, roles of White power and privilege, historical and institutional structures of interlocking forms of oppression, and, more importantly, perspectives and experiences of actual people of color that were marginalized as a consequence of racism.

Starting from the 1970s, along with the U.S. civil rights movement, psychologists began to focus on the perspective and agency of racial/ethnic minority groups in how they make meaning, struggle, and cope with racism (Winston, 2004). Related theories and empirically validated measures of racial/ethnic discrimination from a minority perspective continually flourish today with more specific experiences grounded in the history and identity of the marginalized groups (e.g., Gendered Racial Microaggressions Scale for Black women; Lewis & Neville, 2015). Where once there were few validated self-report measures of perceived racism that primarily focused on racialized experiences of African Americans, a recent review identified 24 validated instruments grounded in diverse theoretical and racial/ethnic populations (Yoo & Pituc, 2013).

Still, there are many marginalized groups that are understudied. For instance, a great deal of the pioneering research on constructs relevant to racial/ethnic minority populations was conducted with African Americans, with less attention to other minority groups (see Hughes et al., 2006). Although there are certainly some shared experiences among racial/ethnic minority groups associated with being a minority in a racially stratified society, there are important distinctions and racial trajectories of groups that normalize and reinforce White racism (e.g., stereotypes of Asian Americans as the model minority in contrast to African Americans as lazy and dangerous; Omi & Winant, 1994). Empirical examination of these other groups (e.g., Asian American, Pacific Islander, Latinx, Indigenous) grounded in their unique racialized history and contexts have far less representation. The value of such perspectives can be seen in the response to Lilienfeld's (2017) critique of microaggression research. In offering a detailed critique of a field he had no prior involvement with, he unintentionally illustrated the potential consequences of not being familiar with the history or context of a construct (Kraus & Park, 2017). Moreover, he either downplayed or altogether dismissed the voiced experiences of racial/ethnic minorities themselves who have been subject to such slights.

Research on racial/ethnic identity development illustrates how a delayed focus on minority-related constructs leads to a concomitant delay in cumulative development knowledge.

The identity status model—a widely used model of identity in developmental psychology focusing on the domains of occupation, religion, politics, friendships, and so forth—was developed in the 1960s (Marcia, 1966) and used extensively across the 1970s and 1980s (see van Hoof, 1999). It was not until the 1990s that researchers began to examine ethnicity as a domain within the model in earnest (Phinney, 1990). Much of the next decade and a half was spent conducting basic descriptive and correlational research on the model, and there were almost no longitudinal studies until the mid-2000s (French, Seidman, Allen, & Aber, 2006; Pahl & Way, 2006). Comparable research for the other identity status domains was conducted nearly 30 years prior.

Beyond the importance of the lack of cumulative developmental knowledge, this delayed start for racial/ethnic identity development research made it difficult for interested researchers to disseminate their work in high-impact publication outlets. The journals considered prestigious in the field place a strong emphasis on unearthing causal processes, but it is impossible to speak to causality among constructs when the constructs themselves are not properly understood. Thus, from a systemic perspective, the historical lack of inclusion of minority-relevant constructs leads to disparities even when they begin to be included, given that we operate in a system that rewards dissemination in particular journals (see Syed, 2017).

### Segregation: Who Gets Left Out?

Like social stratification, segregation serves as a mediator between social position and youth contexts in the integrative model. Segregation is not only residential but also economic, social, and psychological (García Coll et al., 1996). As noted in the previous section, stratification concerning what is scientifically valued leads to segregation (exclusion) of topics and populations of study. The original integrative model was intended to address development of “minority” children broadly construed, but it has subsequently been used largely to understand the development of racial/ethnic minority children. One of the values of an intersectional analytic lens is that it highlights how bringing attention to invisibilities in one aspect of diversity (e.g., race/ethnicity) can lead to lack of attention to other aspects of diversity. The issue of invisibilities in the developmental sciences is especially pronounced among individuals who belong to multiple marginalized groups, including those who experience multiple and overlapping systemic forces of oppression (e.g., racism and heterosexism). This is even the case *within* dimensions of diversity. As noted previously, the accumulated psychological knowledge is uneven across different racial/ethnic minority groups, with much more research being conducted with African Americans than with other groups. For example, Filipino Americans are the third largest group of Asian Americans, with the longest history

in the United States, and yet there are still relatively few studies focusing on them (see [Nadal, 2011](#)). Accordingly, there is a need to expand the “invisibilities” researchers explore. In this next section, we highlight three intersections to illustrate the point: sexual minority youth of color, immigrant youth with disabilities, and racial/ethnic minorities in an international context.

**Sexual minority youth of color.** Sexual minority youth of color have been chronically excluded from research with youth in general but also research with sexual minority youth. Using the broad criteria of locating any published studies since 1990 focused on health and well-being that included sexual minority youth of color in its sample, [Toomey, Huynh, Jones, Lee, and Revels-Macalinao \(2017\)](#) were able to identify 125 reports but found that a very small proportion of these studies examined some form of intersections of racism and heterosexism by exploring, for example, the intersections of racial/ethnic and sexual minority identities. Moreover, studies tended to adopt a deficit framing versus one that considers cultural strengths and normative development.

There has been limited attention paid to the development of sexual minority youth in the developmental sciences, with research on gender-related traits, concepts, and attitudes often examined from the perspective of sexual-dominant youth ([Zosuls et al., 2009](#)). During a 2017 peer research preconference meeting related to gender and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex youth preceding the meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, scholars noted that we, in fact, are not even sure how to ask developmentally appropriate and gender-inclusive questions about sexuality to children and youth in the general population. The forces of homophobia and heterosexism promote the invisibilities faced by sexual minority children and youth in schools, as school principals and district institutional research boards may be reluctant to allow questions related to sexuality in surveys of children and youth (although there are exceptions, e.g., [Poteat, Scheer, & Chong, 2016](#)). These challenges only serve to further marginalize individuals who experience oppression related to being a sexual minority or gender nonconforming.

**Immigrant youth with disabilities.** Disabilities can encompass sensory, cognitive, physical, or psychological impairments. Immigrant children who have a disability experience an additional layer of challenge for adjustment if teachers and schools are unfamiliar with issues of immigration ([Birman & Tran, 2015](#)) and lack appropriate support and services, all of which may lead to greater stigmatization and marginalization ([Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, & Todorova, 2010](#)). Including an intersectional perspective avoids painting an overly simplistic view of their experiences, but few studies have focused on immigrant children with disabilities.

From a disability critical race theory perspective, the term *racial colorblindness* is viewed as problematic, as it frames colorblindness as a disability, as a weakness—a limitation that then confounds dismissing race with a deficit-oriented portrayal of people with disabilities ([Annamma, Jackson, & Morrison, 2016](#)). Racial colorblindness falsely equates blindness (not seeing) with ignorance. A suggested alternate term is *color evasiveness*, which better captures a racial ideology using a term that does not contribute to positioning people with disabilities as lacking something or being deficient ([Frankenburg, 1993](#)). This issue of terminology highlights the need to always assess assumptions and bias that may be embedded in our scholarship, and how even when focused on addressing one form of oppression, we inadvertently engage in another.

**Racial/ethnic minorities in an international context.** There is a great need for understanding the experiences and development of racial/ethnic minorities within an international context. Psychological research on racial/ethnic minorities is dominated by U.S.-centric models of minority developmental processes. Although there is research on racial/ethnic minority development in countries such as the Netherlands ([Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007](#)), Germany ([Frankenberg, Kupper, Wagner, & Bongard, 2013](#)), and South Africa ([Ferguson & Adams, 2016](#)), the research base is still heavily skewed by research in the United States. Expanding the national contexts will bring greater attention to some overlooked populations within developmental research. The U.S. population constitutes less than 5% of the world’s population, clearly signaling that the accumulated research does not represent human diversity ([Arnett, 2008](#)), and also that such a strong focus on the United States and its peculiarities may lead us to miss important aspects of development (see also the limitations of WEIRD samples; [Henrich et al., 2010](#)). For example, unlike the United States, in Africa, Europe, and parts of Asia, most children are multilingual; yet most of our understanding of language development, having been conducted in the United States, is not focused on studies of multilingual children.

A major challenge of using U.S. developed constructs to understand racial/ethnic minority psychology in countries other than the United States is that basic systems and constructs may not transfer. For example, the categories for racial/ethnic groups used in the United States are not used in countries such as Germany or Sweden, which rely more heavily on an immigrant/nonimmigrant dichotomy ([Gyberg, Frisén, Syed, Wängqvist, & Svensson, 2018](#)), or countries such as South Africa, which has a classification system that reflects its long history with colonialism ([Ferguson & Adams, 2016](#)). Nevertheless, basic constructs developed in the United States, including racial/ethnic identity, cultural socialization, and perceived discrimination can be fruitfully explored outside of the United States.

## The Path Forward

In the preceding sections, we highlighted various factors that contribute to intersectional invisibilities in the developmental sciences and beyond. We conclude our analysis by expanding on the preceding to consider potential paths of change. To do so, we highlight avenues for change that align with each of the three questions motivated by the intersectional analytic lens.

### Expanding Social Positions: Diversifying the Faculty and Broadening the Vantage Points

We need to have both new ways of thinking represented in our science and greater diversity of the bodies doing the science. One without the other will not do. Importantly, universities must make diversity and issues of representation central to discussions of hiring at every step of the process, including how diversity impacts and shapes what positions need to be filled, who chairs and sits on the search committee, and how advertisements are worded. For instance, a critical means through which developmental programs, and universities alike, can promote diversity in science is to engage in the practice of promoting diversity cluster hires, which are considered best practice (Sgoutas-Emch, Baird, Myers, Camacho, & Lord, 2016). This practice is especially important in promoting a sense of community for faculty doing research in this area who often find themselves alone and marginalized within their own programs by virtue of having a line of research that makes diversity central to scholarship (Stanley, 2006). Promoting a sense of community among faculty members is an important tool in promoting not only recruitment but also retention. More retention efforts of minority faculty are needed at the institutional level. In addition to cluster hiring, faculty mentoring programs, diversity funding initiatives, and other programs should be evaluated to examine what minority faculty need not only to survive but also to thrive. Furthermore, emphasizing the need for more recruitment, retention, and achievement of faculty of color does not eliminate the commitment, responsibility, and role of White faculty needed to help promote more diverse and inclusive environment in psychology.

At the center of diversity and representation efforts, one must also address the need for equity and social justice. It is important to remember that social inequities are not a simple byproduct of “lack of inclusion.” Rather, inequities are a consequence of the power conferred to the dominant group—both historically and contemporarily—that have shaped the different lived experiences between “majorities” and “minorities.” Therefore, it is not only about the diverse representation of faculty and research but also addressing the inequity within the system, such as what type of research and teaching is valued, disproportionate service load, and who gets promotion and tenure. It is important for the

uninitiated to be aware that there are resources available to help guide such efforts. *Presumed Incompetent: The Intersections of Race and Class for Women in Academia* (Muhs, Niemann, González, & Harris, 2012) is an extensive compilation of essays and analyses from women-of-color faculty writing about their experiences in academia across the United States. The volume includes a detailed list of recommendations for administrators, faculty, and allies to promote university climates that will eliminate tokenism and provide a context enabling diverse women of color to succeed.

In addition to increasing the representation of diverse bodies, the advancement of an inclusive developmental science requires making space for new perspectives that do not neatly fit with existing models. One approach is to direct resources from existing structures that have not historically supported alternative views. For example, organizations and societies can promote systemic change by encouraging the formation of study groups that bring together young scientists advocating change in the field in coalition with senior scholars who are open to this work. The Society for Research on Adolescence, for example, funded the Intersectionality in the Developmental Sciences Study Group, which aims to infuse an intersectionality-inspired perspective in theory, methods, and practice within developmental psychology. This approach might be uncomfortable for some, as it necessarily requires redirection of resources away from projects rooted in traditional vantage points. However, recognizing that this type of investment is beneficial for the field as a whole would go a long way to reducing such discomfort.

A complementary approach to one that redirects existing resources is to make room for different types of research than is typical in psychology. Developmental research has long been closely linked with policies and practices out in the world, but, by and large, in terms of how to *translate* research *into* policy and practice. Within this larger endeavor of linking systems-level processes (e.g., laws and policies) with individual-level processes, one critical omission in the developmental literature is a consideration of the developmental and psychological implications of a burgeoning area of research in legal studies on legal consciousness. In a recent study, Santos and colleagues (2016) attempted to bridge legal consciousness perspectives with a developmental framework. By asking youth how aware they were of Arizona’s controversial immigration law SB1070, a perspective from youth on laws that we seldom, if ever, consider capturing in developmental science, they were able to show longitudinally that greater awareness of SB1070 predicted later drops in performance at school among Latino males. Thus, rather than viewing the research-to-policy link in linear terms, this type of research reflects

the deep embeddedness of the two in the lives of youth of color.

### Breaking Down Social Stratification: Valuing a Broader Array of Questions

Valuing a broader array of research questions in the field is no easy task, as it requires a reexamination of deeply held convictions about the nature of our science. First, doing so will require rejecting the idea that unearthing causation is the gold standard of our work. Rather, identifying potential causal mechanisms for psychological phenomena should be viewed as one of many valuable research activities. Basic observational and descriptive research, which is the bedrock of a solid science, ought to be just as worthy of grant funding and publication in flagship journals. Given the historical exclusion of research with racial/ethnic minorities, such a perspective is all but necessary to move toward a more inclusive and equitable science (Syed, 2017).

On a related note, the valuing of quantitative over qualitative methods is another tension in our field that limits our ability to diversify what questions we ask and value. For example, the chronic preference of quantitative methods, and the viewing of these approaches as inherently incompatible, limits our understanding that the wording of our measures, models, and theories are inextricably linked to lived experiences and narratives. The siloing of quantitative and qualitative methods limits researchers' abilities to ask important and relevant questions in their work. For example, there is a rich tradition in participatory methods to value the perspective and voices of who gets studied. Although we encourage thoughtful engagement with this practice, we see potential in having conversations with participants at the onset of a study, whether quantitative or qualitative. For example, members a community being studied can provide invaluable insight on the ways in which measures, goals, and conceptualizations of phenomena miss the mark (or not) in relation to their lived experiences. Valuing these voices does not mean giving up our training and skills. Rather, it shows that we value the perspective of individuals embedded within the communities we study (Rosenthal, 2016).

### Reducing Segregation: Building Coalitions to Promote Inclusiveness

As we move toward a more inclusive science, it is also critical to continuously ask the question of who is being left out of those advances. Again, this process is not meant to be a full representational "check-box" of all configurations of subordinated social groups. It is instructive to recall that Crenshaw's (1991) writing on intersectionality was a critique of identity politics and called for a recognition that identity groups themselves are coalitions (e.g., the collective identity "LGB" is composed of coalitions of women,

men, people of various racial/ethnic backgrounds, social classes). The challenge of intersectionality theory to scholar-activists was to focus on systems (i.e., heterosexism, racism, sexism) rather than on identities/identity groups, and to build coalitions across single identity categories to challenge these systems (Moradi & Grzanka, 2017). Thus, efforts aimed at building and maintaining coalitions (e.g., cluster hires) are likely to have the greater impact on reforming the current system.

### Conclusions

The purpose of this article was to bring a systemic perspective to developmental science through a discussion of current practices in the field. Merging an intersectional analysis with García Coll et al.'s (1996) integrative model facilitated a focus on how developmental psychology, and psychology more broadly, creates and sustains the invisibility of racial/ethnic minorities. The three questions discussed in the paper—From whose vantage point is research conducted? What types of questions are valued? And who gets left out?—highlight the complexities of the issues. Of course, these are not the only three questions that can, or should, be asked. But as our society and field continue to diversify, *questions must be asked*. Only by asking such questions and bringing greater awareness to the oppressive context of current research practices can we possibly begin to generate solutions that will benefit science for all.

### References

- American Psychological Association. (2000). *Data on race/ethnicity*. Retrieved from <http://research.apa.org/racefig7.html>
- American Psychological Association. (2010). *2008–2009 Faculty in U.S. and Canadian graduate departments of psychology*. Retrieved from <http://www.apa.org/workforce/publications/10-grad-study/index.aspx>
- Annamma, S. A., Jackson, D. D., & Morrison, D. (2016). Conceptualizing color-evasiveness: Using dis/ability critical race theory to expand a color-blind ideology in education and society. *Race, Ethnicity and Education*, 20, 147–162. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13613324.2016.1248837>
- Arnett, J. J. (2008). The neglected 95%: Why American psychology needs to become less American. *American Psychologist*, 63, 602–614. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.63.7.602>
- Birman, D., & Tran, N. (2015). *The academic engagement of newly arriving Somali Bantu students in a U.S. elementary school*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Bonilla-Silva, E. (2015). The structure of racism in color-blind, "post-racial" America. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 59, 1358–1376. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764215586826>
- Brayboy, B. M. K. J. (2003). The implementation of diversity in predominantly white colleges and universities. *Journal of Black Studies*, 34, 72–86. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0021934703253679>
- Bronfenbrenner, U. (1979). *The ecology of human development: Experiments by nature and design*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Causadias, J. M., Telzer, E. H., & Gonzales, N. A. (2018). (Eds.). *Handbook of culture and biology interplay: Bridging evolutionary adaptation and development*. New York, NY: Wiley.
- Cauce, A. M., Coronado, N., & Watson, J. (1998). Conceptual, method-

- ological, and statistical issues in culturally competent research. In M. Hernandez & R. Mareasa (Eds.), *Promoting cultural competence in children's mental health services* (pp. 305–329). Baltimore, MD: Paul Brooks.
- Cole, E. R. (2009). Intersectionality and research in psychology. *American Psychologist*, *64*, 170–180. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0014564>
- Collins, P. H. (1989). The social construction of Black feminist thought. *Signs*, *14*, 745–773. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/494543>
- Combahee River Collective. (1983). The Combahee River Collective statement. In B. Smith (Ed.), *Homegirls: A Black feminist anthology* (pp. 264–274). New York, NY: Kitchen Table, Women of Color Press. (Original work published 1977)
- Credé, M., Tynan, M. C., & Harms, P. D. (2017). Much ado about grit: A meta-analytic synthesis of the grit literature. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *113*, 492–511. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000102>
- Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. *Stanford Law Review*, *43*, 1241–1299. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1229039>
- Delgado Bernal, D., Elenes, C. A., Godinez, F., & Villenas, S. (2006). *Chicana/Latina Education in Everyday Life: Feminista Perspectives on Pedagogy and Epistemology*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Diemer, M. A., & Li, C. H. (2011). Critical consciousness development and political participation among marginalized youth. *Child Development*, *82*, 1815–1833. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01650.x>
- Duckworth, A. L., Peterson, C., Matthews, M. D., & Kelly, D. R. (2007). Grit: Perseverance and passion for long-term goals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *92*, 1087–1101. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.6.1087>
- Dweck, C. S. (2006). *Mindset: The new psychology of success*. New York, NY: Random House.
- Ferguson, G. M., & Adams, B. G. (2016). Americanization in the rainbow nation: Remote acculturation and psychological well-being of South African emerging adults. *Emerging Adulthood*, *4*, 104–118. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2167696815599300>
- Fiske, S. T. (1998). Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (4th ed., Vol. 1–2, pp. 357–411). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Frankenburg, R. (1993). *White women, race matters: The social construction of whiteness*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Frankenberg, E., Kupper, K., Wagner, R., & Bongard, S. (2013). Immigrant youth in Germany. *European Psychologist*, *18*, 158–168. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000154>
- French, S. E., Seidman, E., Allen, L., & Aber, J. L. (2006). The development of ethnic identity during adolescence. *Developmental Psychology*, *42*, 1–10. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.42.1.1>
- García Coll, C., Lambert, G., Jenkins, R., McAdoo, H. P., Crnic, K., Wasik, B. H., & Vázquez García, H. (1996). An integrative model for the study of developmental competencies in minority children. *Child Development*, *67*, 1891–1914. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1131600>
- Ghavami, N., & Peplau, L. A. (2013). An intersectional analysis of gender and ethnic stereotypes: Testing three hypotheses. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, *37*, 113–127. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0361684312464203>
- Gjerde, P. F. (2004). Culture, power, and experience: Toward a person-centered cultural psychology. *Human Development*, *47*, 138–157. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000077987>
- Gogolin, I. (2002). Linguistic and cultural diversity in Europe: A challenge for educational research and practice. *European Educational Research Journal*, *1*, 123–138. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2304/eeerj.2002.1.1.3>
- Gould, W. A., & Heine, S. J. (2012). Implicit essentialism: Genetic concepts are implicitly associated with fate concepts. *PLoS ONE*, *7*(6), e38176. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0038176>
- Graham, S. (1992). “Most of the subjects were white and middle class”: Trends in published research on African Americans in selected APA journals, 1970–1989. *American Psychologist*, *47*, 629–639. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.47.5.629>
- Grusec, J. E. (2011). Socialization processes in the family: Social and emotional development. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *62*, 243–269. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.121208.131650>
- Gyberg, F., Frisén, A., Syed, M., Wängqvist, M., & Svensson, Y. (2018). Another kind of Swede: Swedish youth's ethnic identity narratives. *Emerging Adulthood*, *6*, 17–31. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2167696817690087>
- Hall, G. C. N., Yip, T., & Zárate, M. A. (2016). On becoming multicultural in a monocultural research world: A conceptual approach to studying ethnocultural diversity. *American Psychologist*, *71*, 40–51. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039734>
- Hammack, P. L. (2008). Narrative and the cultural psychology of identity. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *12*, 222–247. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1088868308316892>
- Harris, A. P., & González, C. G. (2012). Introduction. In G. G. Muhs, Y. F. Niemann, C. G. González, & A. P. Harris (Eds.), *Presumed incompetent: The intersections of race and class for women in academia* (pp. 1–16). Logan, UT: Utah State University Press. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt4cgr3k>
- Hartmann, W. E., Kim, E. S., Kim, J. J., Nguyen, T. U., Wendt, D. C., Nagata, D. K., & Gone, J. P. (2013). In search of cultural diversity, revisited: Recent publication trends in cross-cultural and ethnic minority psychology. *Review of General Psychology*, *17*, 243–254. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0032260>
- Helms, J. E., Jernigan, M., & Mascher, J. (2005). The meaning of race in psychology and how to change it: A methodological perspective. *American Psychologist*, *60*, 27–36. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.1.27>
- Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, *33*, 61–83. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0999152X>
- Hochschild, J. L. (1996). *Facing up to the American dream: Race, class, and the soul of the nation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781400821730>
- Hughes, D., Rodriguez, J., Smith, E. P., Johnson, D. J., Stevenson, H. C., & Spicer, P. (2006). Parents' ethnic-racial socialization practices: A review of research and directions for future study. *Developmental Psychology*, *42*, 747–770. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.42.5.747>
- Juang, L. P., Hou, Y., Douglass Bayless, S., & Kim, S. Y. (2017). Time varying associations of parent-adolescent cultural conflict and youth adjustment among Chinese American families. *Developmental Psychology*. Advance online publication. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000475>
- Juang, L., Syed, M., Cookston, J., Wang, Y., & Kim, S.-Y. (2012). Everyday and acculturation-based family conflict among Chinese American parents and adolescents. In L. Juang & A. Umaña-Taylor (Issue Eds.), *Family conflict among Chinese and Mexican-origin adolescents and their parents in the U.S.: New directions in child and adolescent development* (Vol. 135, pp. 13–34). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Kena, G., Hussar, W., McFarland, J., de Brey, C., Musu-Gillette, L., Wang, X., ... Dunlop Velez, E. (2016). *The condition of education 2016 (NCES 2016-144): U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics*. Retrieved March 29, 2018, from <http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch>
- Kraus, M. W., & Park, J. W. (2017, March 20). *Microaggressions as part of the historical context of stigma and prejudice*. Retrieved from [osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/622ke](https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/622ke)
- Laursen, B., Coy, K. C., & Collins, W. A. (1998). Reconsidering changes in parent-child conflict across adolescence: A meta-analysis. *Child Development*, *69*, 817–832. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1998.00817.x>

- Lewis, J. A., & Neville, H. A. (2015). Construction and initial validation of the Gendered Racial Microaggressions Scale for Black women. *Journal of Counseling Psychology, 62*, 289–302. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cou0000062>
- Lilienfeld, S. O. (2017). Microaggressions: Strong claims, inadequate evidence. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12*, 138–169. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1745691616659391>
- Marcia, J. E. (1966). Development and validation of ego-identity status. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3*, 551–558. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0023281>
- Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review, 98*, 224–253. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.98.2.224>
- McAdams, D. P. (2006). *The redemptive self: Stories Americans live by-revised and expanded edition*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176933.001.0001>
- McLean, K. C., & Syed, M. (2015). Personal, master, and alternative narratives: An integrative framework for understanding identity development in context. *Human Development, 58*, 318–349. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000445817>
- McLloyd, V. C. (2006). The role of African American scholars in research on African American children: Historical perspectives and personal reflections. *Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 71*, 121–144. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5834.2006.00365.x>
- Moradi, B., & Grzanka, P. R. (2017). Using intersectionality responsibly: Toward critical epistemology, structural analysis, and social justice activism. *Journal of Counseling Psychology, 64*, 500–513. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cou0000203>
- Muhs, G. G., Niemann, Y. F., González, C. G., & Harris, A. P. (Eds.). (2012). *Presumed incompetent: The intersections of race and class for women in academia*. Logan, UT: Utah State University Press. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt4cgr3k>
- Nadal, K. L. (2011). *Filipino American psychology: A handbook of theory, research, and clinical practice*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118094747>
- Nagayama Hall, G. C., & Maramba, G. G. (2001). In search of cultural diversity: Recent literature in cross-cultural and ethnic minority psychology. *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 7*, 12–26. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1099-9809.7.1.12>
- National Science Foundation. (2017). *National center for science and engineering statistics: Survey of earned doctorates*. Retrieved from <https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2017/nsf17306/datatables/tab-23.htm>
- Neville, H. A., Lilly, R. L., Duran, G., Lee, R. M., & Browne, L. (2000). Construction and initial validation of the Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS). *Journal of Counseling Psychology, 47*, 59–70. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-0167.47.1.59>
- Nielsen, M., Haun, D., Kärtner, J., & Legare, C. H. (2017). The persistent sampling bias in developmental psychology: A call to action. *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 162*, 31–38. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2017.04.017>
- Omi, M., & Winant, H. (1994). *Racial formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Pahl, K., & Way, N. (2006). Longitudinal trajectories of ethnic identity among urban Black and Latino adolescents. *Child Development, 77*, 1403–1415. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00943.x>
- Phinney, J. S. (1990). Ethnic identity in adolescents and adults: Review of research. *Psychological Bulletin, 108*, 499–514. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.499>
- Pittman, C. T. (2010). Race and gender oppression in the classroom: The experiences of women faculty of color with white male students. *Teaching Sociology, 38*, 183–196. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0092055X10370120>
- Poteat, V. P., Scheer, J. R., & Chong, E. S. (2016). Sexual orientation-based disparities in school and juvenile justice discipline: A multiple group comparison of contributing factors. *Journal of Educational Psychology, 108*, 229–241. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/edu0000058>
- Purdie-Vaughns, V., & Eibach, R. P. (2008). Intersectional invisibility: The distinctive advantages and disadvantages of multiple subordinate-group identities. *Sex Roles, 59*, 377–391. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11199-008-9424-4>
- Quintana, S. M., Aboud, F. E., Chao, R. K., Contreras-Grau, J., Cross, W. E., Hudley, C., . . . Vietze, D. L. (2006). Race, ethnicity, and culture in child development: Contemporary research and future directions. *Child Development, 77*, 1129–1141. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00951.x>
- Richards, G. (1997). *Race, racism, and psychology: A reflexive history*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Rosenthal, L. (2016). Incorporating intersectionality into psychology: An opportunity to promote social justice and equity. *American Psychologist, 71*, 474–485. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0040323>
- Rosenthal, L., & Levy, S. R. (2010). The colorblind, multicultural, and polycultural ideological approaches to improving intergroup attitudes and relations. *Social Issues and Policy Review, 4*, 215–246. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-2409.2010.01022.x>
- Rowley, S. J., & Camacho, T. C. (2015). Increasing diversity in cognitive developmental research: Issues and solutions. *Journal of Cognition and Development, 16*, 683–692. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2014.976224>
- Santos, C. E., Menjívar, C., VanDaalen, R. A., Kornienko, O., Updegraff, K. A., & Cruz, S. (2016). Awareness of Arizona's immigration law SB 1070 predicts classroom behavioural problems among Latino youths during early adolescence. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Advance online publication. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1311021>
- Schwartz, S. J., Lilienfeld, S. O., Meca, A., & Sauvigné, K. C. (2016). The role of neuroscience within psychology: A call for inclusiveness over exclusiveness. *American Psychologist, 71*, 52–70. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039678>
- Sgoutas-Emch, S., Baird, L., Myers, P., Camacho, M., & Lord, S. (2016). We're not all White men: Using a cohort/cluster approach to diversify STEM faculty hiring. *Thought & Action, 32*, 91–107.
- Shweder, R. A. (2000). The psychology of practice and the practice of the three psychologies. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 3*, 207–222. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-839X.00065>
- Stanley, C. A. (2006). *Faculty of color: Teaching in predominantly White colleges and universities*. Bolton, MA: Anker.
- Sternberg, R. J. (2016). “Am I famous yet?” Judging scholarly merit in psychological science: An introduction. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11*, 877–881. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1745691616661777>
- Suárez-Orozco, C., Suárez-Orozco, M. M., & Todorova, I. (2010). *Learning a new land: Immigrant students in American society*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Sue, S. (1999). Science, ethnicity, and bias: Where have we gone wrong? *American Psychologist, 54*, 1070–1077. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.54.12.1070>
- Syed, M. (2016). Power and agency in conceptualizing life stages as master narratives. *Human Development, 59*, 317–323. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000455016>
- Syed, M. (2017). Why traditional metrics may not adequately represent ethnic minority psychology. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12*, 1162–1165. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1745691617709590>
- Syed, M., & Ajayi, A. A. (in press). Promises and pitfalls in the integration of intersectionality with development science. In C. E. Santos & R. B. Toomey (Eds.), *Envisioning the integration of an intersectionality lens in development science: New directions for child and adolescent development*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Toomey, R. B., Huynh, V. W., Jones, S. K., Lee, S., & Revels-Macalino, M. (2017). Sexual minority youth of color: A content analysis and

- critical review of the literature. *Journal of Gay & Lesbian Mental Health*, 21, 3–31. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19359705.2016.1217499>
- Umaña-Taylor, A. J., Quintana, S. M., Lee, R. M., Cross, W. E., Jr., Rivas-Drake, D., Schwartz, S. J., . . . Ethnic and Racial Identity in the 21st Century Study Group. (2014). Ethnic and racial identity during adolescence and into young adulthood: An integrated conceptualization. *Child Development*, 85, 21–39. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12196>
- van Hoof, A. (1999). The identity status field re-reviewed: An update of unresolved and neglected issues with a view on some alternative approaches. *Developmental Review*, 19, 497–556. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/drev.1999.0484>
- Vasquez, M. J. T., Lott, B., García-Vázquez, E., Grant, S. K., Iwamasa, G. Y., Molina, L. E., . . . Vestal-Dowdy, E. (2006). Personal reflections: Barriers and strategies in increasing diversity in psychology. *American Psychologist*, 61, 157–172. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.61.2.157>
- Verkuyten, M., & Yildiz, A. A. (2007). National (dis)identification and ethnic and religious identity: A study among Turkish-Dutch Muslims. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33, 1448–1462. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167207304276>
- Whaley, A. L. (2009). Stereotype threat paradigm in search of a phenomenon: A comment on Kellow and Jones's (2008) study. *Journal of Black Psychology*, 35, 485–494. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095798408329986>
- Whiteman, S. D., McHale, S. M., & Crouter, A. C. (2011). Family relationships from adolescence to early adulthood: Changes in the family system following firstborns' leaving home. *Journal of Research on Adolescence*, 21, 461–474. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7795.2010.00683.x>
- Winston, A. S. (Ed.). (2004). *Defining difference: Race and racism in the history of psychology*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/10625-000>
- Yoo, H. C., & Pituc, S. (2013). Assessments of perceived racial stereotypes, discrimination, and racism. In K. F. Geisinger (Ed.), *APA handbook of testing and assessment in psychology* (pp. 427–451). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14048-025>
- Zosuls, K. M., Ruble, D. N., Tamis-Lemonda, C. S., Shrout, P. E., Bornstein, M. H., & Greulich, F. K. (2009). The acquisition of gender labels in infancy: Implications for gender-typed play. *Developmental Psychology*, 45, 688–701. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0014053>

Received May 1, 2017

Revision received December 16, 2017

Accepted December 18, 2017 ■